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ABSTRACT 
 
ESSAYS IN URBAN ECONOMICS 
 
By 
 
KALEE ELISE BURNS 
 
AUGUST 2020 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Carlianne Patrick  
 
Major Department: Economics  
 
 
This dissertation examines different topics within the sphere of urban economics. My first 
chapter, “Social Capital and Entrepreneurship”, explores the role of social capital – at the 
community and individual level – in the pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunities measured 
through self-employment. I define social capital along two dimensions: trust and network social 
capital. Using two-sample two-stage least squares (2S2SLS), I construct measures of trust and 
network social capital for respondents in the restricted 2000 U.S. Long Form Decennial Census 
and predict the likelihood that a person is observed in a self-employed state using a multinomial 
regression. I find that individuals with high amounts of network social capital characterized by 
informal relationships (hereafter referred to as “weak network social capital”) are 0.56 percentage 
points more likely to be observed in self-employment compared to individuals with medium or 
low levels of weak network social capital. Measuring social capital at the census tract level, only 
individuals living in communities with high levels of weak network social capital and strong 
network social capital (characterized by familial or close-friend relationships) have statistically 
higher probabilities of being observed in self-employment relative to individuals in communities 
with low and medium levels of network social capital. Stratifying the sample by urbanicity, the 
relationship between social capital and self-employment is stronger for individuals with high 
 
 
weak networks who live in the most rural census tracks in the United States. These results imply 
that increasing social interactions in communities through the promotion of social capital 
building entities (i.e. clubs and social groups) may be an innovative and low-cost intervention for 
communities with potentially poor labor market opportunities. 
In my second chapter, “Amenities and the College-Educated: A Gentrification 
Perspective," I examine gentrification across all metropolitan areas in the U.S. between 2007 and 
2014 and develop a conceptual framework of gentrification that has causal interpretations. 
Gentrification is an important topic within public policy, being a subject of debate and interest 
for economists, city planners, and politicians. Recent evidence of gentrification in several U.S. 
cities finds a significant correlation between gentrification (via increases in a neighborhood’s 
share of college graduates) and the location of consumption amenities. This paper develops a 
conceptual model as the basis for estimating gentrification and amenity establishment location 
simultaneously for Core-Based Statistical Areas in the U.S.  between 2007 and 2014. I use a 
measure of operationally defined gentrification whereby the underlying measure is share of 
college graduates in a neighborhood.  I find that when controlling for the simultaneous nature 
between amenities and gentrification, gentrification increases the consumption amenities in a 
neighborhood by 4%. Contrastingly, there is no clear evidence that gentrification increases the 
number of neighborhood amenities  
Finally, my third chapter, “Revisiting the Burden of the Gas Tax in an Electric Vehicle 
World," examines changes in the distribution of the gasoline tax burden in the presence of 
increased electric vehicle adoption. In the last several decades there has been a large growth in 
the number of electric vehicles on the roads. However, even with this growth, the primary source 
of infrastructure funding in the U.S. continues to be gasoline taxes. Less demand for gasoline 
 
 
may impact the elasticity of demand for gasoline, therefore potentially threatening a revenue 
source. Furthermore, the burden of the tax will continue to shift towards consumers of gas-
powered vehicles. This chapter re-examines a model of gas-tax incidence using updated 
consumer data.  I then simulate  electric vehicle purchases to examine the burden on consumers 
when the national gasoline tax is increased.   
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Chapter I: Social Capital and Entrepreneurship!!
I. Introduction 
 Entrepreneurship is a vital part of the U.S. economy. As of 2019, thirty percent of the 
workforce is either self-employed or working for someone who is self-employed.1 The self-
employed themselves make up ten percent of the workforce in the United States.2 Individuals’ 
abilities, family background, financial constraints, and strength of ethnic enclaves are all 
important factors behind an individual’s choice to pursue self-employment (Le 1999).  This 
paper explores the potential role of social capital as an additional contributor to the pursuit of 
entrepreneurial opportunities as measured through self-employment. I find a person’s general 
level of trust and strength of social networks, as well as the community's level of these social 
capital measures, to be important, in varying degrees, for a person's self-employment decision. 
Robert Putnam's work, “Bowling Alone” describes how social capital in America has been in a 
decline since the 1970s. As a potentially important resource in employment decisions, declines in 
social capital have implications for the United States labor market. The findings in this paper 
could prove useful to policy makers in communities with a goal of promoting entrepreneurial and 
other economic activity.   
 Defined as the value of social connections, formal and informal, that individuals can use 
to achieve private or collective objectives, social capital is commonly referred to as the societal 
counterpart to physical or economic capital.3 This paper will examine social capital’s influence 
on the self-employment decision along two dimensions: structural social capital and cognitive 
social capital. Harpham et al. (2002, p. 106) characterize the two dimensions: “as what people 
                                                
1 10 facts about American workers 
2 Three-in-Ten U.S. Jobs Are Held by the Self-Employed and the Workers They Hire  
3 Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey Description  
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‘do’ and what people ‘feel’ in terms of social relations.” Cognitive social capital “derives from 
individuals’ perceptions and mental processes resulting in norms, values and beliefs that promote 
cooperation” (Sabatini, 2015). Cognitive social capital is usually in the form of social trust or 
trust in members of one’s own family (Lancee 2010; Kwon, Heflin, and Ruef 2013; Hotchkiss 
and Rupasingha 2018a). In this paper, I quantify cognitive social capital using various measures 
of trust. Contrastingly, structural social capital is network-based and quantified by connections in 
a person’s social network and participation in group activities. Additionally, structural social 
capital takes two forms: strong and weak. This delineation of ties within a network comes from 
the work of Mark Granovetter who describes the relative strength of network as either a network 
connection between two close friends (a strong tie) or a connection between two acquaintances 
(a weak tie) (Granovetter 1973). Davidsson and Honig (2003) measure strong network social 
capital, in the context of entrepreneurial activity, as whether an individual has a family member 
who owns a business. Informal, or weak, ties have often been measured as the number of 
organizations in which an individual participates or to which an individual belongs (Kwon et al. 
2013). For the rest of this paper the two types of structural social capital will be called weak 
network and strong network social capital.   
 While previous work has examined the relationship between entrepreneurship and some 
forms of social capital along both of these dimensions, the generalizability of the studies is 
limited by sample size and restrictions to a selected portion of the population (see Stam et al., 
2014 for a review of the literature). In contrast, I utilize the restricted microdata from the 2000 
US Decennial Census (DC) which is a large, nationally representative sample. This survey is a 1 
and 10 sample of the US population. Therefore, it contains over 20 million individual 
observations, with detailed demographic, economics, and most importantly, fine geographic-
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level information. The geographic nature of this is of importance to how one believes social 
capital is generated. Because social capital is who a person knows and is surrounded by, 
geography plays an important role. By utilizing this unique and rich data source I am able to 
improve upon previous studies’ measure of individual and community level social capital by 
using fine geographic information. More specifics of this will be described in a later section.  
  Additionally, this paper contributes to the existing literature by making use of a broad 
range of activities reported in the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey of 2000 
(SCCBS) to construct measures of trust and weak and strong network social capital.4 Further, I 
compare the importance of individual-level versus community-level social capital measures for 
both trust and network measures of social capital in the context of self-employment. Previous 
studies either use only community social capital or one type of individual social capital (Kwon et 
al. 2013; Nieto and González-Álvarez 2016); Nieto & González-Álvarez, 2016).  The analysis 
here also improves upon earlier studies by controlling for selection into the labor market and 
presents a conclusive argument for the empirical relevance of both measures using a large 
nationally representative data set.  
 My analysis seeks to answer the following question: How does social capital influence 
the probability of self-employment relative to other labor market statuses?  This question is 
answered utilizing restricted and confidential data through the combination of both the Census 
Bureau’s Research Data Center and the Roper Center’s Social Capital Community Benchmark 
Survey. Social capital is estimated for respondents in the Decennial Census using two-sample 
two-stage least squares, allowing me to make use of a large, nationally representative sample for 
                                                
4 A more recent 2006 SCCBS survey exists, however it does not contain an indicator for census 
tract, which is important for constructing an instrument for individual social capital (see 
https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/2006-social-capital-community-benchmark-survey/). 
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the analysis. Allowing for three labor market statuses (not in the labor force, paid employment, 
and self-employment), multinomial logit regression analysis provides results unconditional on 
the labor force participation decision.   
 The effect of network social capital at the individual level depends on the strength of the 
network. Weak network social capital positively predicts self-employment while strong network 
social capital negatively predicts self-employment. This is consistent with the idea that a weak 
individual network allows for more new information to flow through the network while a strong 
network can impede information about possible job opportunities. At the community level, both 
network social capital measures are positively predictive of a person being observed in self-
employment. A person's level of trust, and overall trust exhibited by a person's community, was 
not an important factor in positively predicting self-employment decisions. These results are 
consistent across differences in demographics and economic stratifications such as immigrant 
status, “urbanicity” of community, gender, and educational attainment. Of these various 
stratifications, the importance of weak network social capital in the prediction of self-
employment in some of the most rural communities might offer policy makers a tool to spur job 
opportunities for individuals facing potentially poor employment outcomes.  
 The remainder of this paper is as follows: Section II briefly details relevant literature to 
social capital and entrepreneurship; Section III discusses the sources of data used; Section IV 
describes the empirical methodology used to connect social capital with entrepreneurship; 
Section V presents the results; Section VI concludes.  
II. Literature Review and Background 
 II.A. Individual vs. Community Social Capital and Entrepreneurship 
 Much of the previous literature relating entrepreneurship and social capital focuses on 
individual or community social capital but not both (for example, see Davidsson and Honig, 
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2003; Rupasingha et al. 2006; Kwon et al 2013).  Nieto and González-Álvarez (2016) examined 
the joint contribution of community and individual network social capital on entrepreneurship, 
but for Spain only.  One of Glaeser (2007)'s four theories of entrepreneurship suggests that 
entrepreneurial activity in one sector of a community can create a "culture of entrepreneurship,"  
increasing entrepreneurial activity community-wide. Work by Stam et. al (2014) suggests that 
weak network social capital (e.g. social capital associated with participation in volunteer groups) 
is a stronger determinant of entrepreneurship than strong network social capital (e.g. social 
capital associated with number of close friends and family). Furthermore, results from Nieto and 
González-Álvarez (2016) suggest that individual social capital likely has more of an impact on 
entrepreneurship than community level social capital (in Spain).  Strong network social capital is 
typically associated with less influx of information. In Kwon et al. (2013) people who belonged 
to religious and sports-affiliated types of organization are less likely to be connected to any other 
organization. Due to this restriction on dissemination of new information, members with strong 
network social capital may be less aware of entrepreneurial opportunities and are therefore less 
likely to pursue self-employment. Or, alternatively, due to the close nature of their relationships 
with members in their (sports and religious) network, they may be better information about paid 
employment opportunities. Therefore, it is possible that a higher level of this type of social 
capital decreases the probability that an individual becomes an entrepreneur. However, if 
someone is interested in entrepreneurial pursuits and belongs to a close-knit community, then 
this may be advantageous to their ability to exploit business connections.  
 The analysis here contributes to this body of knowledge by combining what has only 
been investigated in pieces and, as far as I know, is the first to do so with a nationally 
representative sample for the U.S. Specifically, both trust and network measures of social capital 
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are considered, and both types of social capital are measured at both the individual and 
community level. A “community” in this paper is measured at the Census tract level. This is a 
more geographically concentrated measure of community than in previous literatures (i.e., Kwon 
et al. 2013).  
 II.B. Nativity and Entrepreneurship 
 This paper also explores how social capital might differentially impact entrepreneurial 
choice decisions between immigrants and natives.  In the U.S. labor force, immigrants make up a 
disproportional share of entrepreneurs. According to Kerr and Kerr (2016), approximately 24% 
of entrepreneurs are immigrants but constitute only 19% of the U.S. workforce. Therefore, 
entrepreneurship appears to be an important form of employment among immigrants.  
 In his investigation of the effect of social capital on employment status among four 
groups of immigrants to the Netherlands, Lancee (2010) finds that weak network social capital is 
a better predictor of self-employment than strong network social capital. Borjas (1986) attributes 
the higher rates of entrepreneurship among immigrants to an “enclave" effect which increases 
self-employment opportunities due to the concentration of residents in a community along a 
shared cultural identity. This shared cultural identity can be a contributing factor to an 
immigrants’ weak network.  My research also supplements work by Kerr and Kerr (2016), who 
examine differences in entrepreneurship between native and immigrants. In that work, the 
authors find that immigrant entrepreneurs have better three- and six-year employment growth 
outcomes than natives. If different types of social capital (trust vs. weak/strong network) and 
from different sources (individual vs. community) impact self-employment decisions differently 
between natives and immigrants, communities may be able to tailor their investments in social 
capital in ways that will be most effective depending on the demographics of the community. 
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 II.C. Rural vs. Urban Differences in Entrepreneurship 
 The potential importance of community level social capital in the determination of 
entrepreneurship suggests that other characteristics of that community might influence the 
interaction between social capital and entrepreneurship. In an urban setting, it is plausible to 
think that one has more weak network social capital due in part to casual contact with more 
people. Contrastingly, in a rural setting one's interactions are likely to mostly involve contact 
with family and friends. 
 Lannoo et al. (2012) lists several reasons why the relationship between social capital and 
entrepreneurship might differ between urban and rural communities. For example, these authors 
suggest urban residents have shallow or superficial social connections which would be expected 
to result in weaker network social capital compared to rural residents. While the authors do not 
specifically speak to entrepreneurial decisions from differences in social capital along urban and 
rural lines, the fact that urban and rural residents might have different levels of social capital (of 
different types) speaks to the importance of investigating its effects in different environments.  
Stam et al.  (2014) find that weak network social capital is more predictive of entrepreneurship 
than strong network social capital; their work suggests that one would find more entrepreneurial 
activity in an urban community. 
 Additionally, in urban areas there are a plethora of institutions that a potential 
entrepreneur can take advantage of when pursuing entrepreneurial endeavors, such as banks and 
business networking events. However, rural areas are often lacking in these types of institutions. 
Social capital may act as a substitute for these types of institutions in small communities or rural 
areas. This is the theory that Bauernschuster et al. (2010) posit in their article. Using information 
on individuals' club memberships, the authors find that there is a larger effect of weak network 
social capital on the probability of individuals becoming an entrepreneur in communities with 
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less than 5,000 people.  In addition to adding to the evidence of how the relationship between 
weak and strong network social capital and entrepreneurial activity differs across urban and rural 
settings, the analysis here will also identify differences in the role community versus individual 
social capital plays in a rural versus urban setting.  
 In the context of employment, self-employment is particularly important for economic 
growth in rural areas. Given that rural and non-metropolitan areas in the United States face more 
instances of paid employment constraints and higher rates of underemployment (Henderson 
2002; Findeis and Jensen 1998), social capital can act a particularly valuable resource in the 
pursuit of self-employment opportunities.  
III. Data 
 This paper utilizes two nationally representative restricted data sources, the 2000 Social 
Capital Community Benchmark Survey (SCCBS) and the long form 2000 U.S. Decennial Census 
(DC). The SCCBS was administered through the Roper Foundation in 2000 and approximately 
25,000 people responded to the survey. One aspect of the survey that makes it a good fit for 
matching with other restricted data sources such as the DC is the record of census tracts, which 
are an often-used measure of community or neighborhood. The SCCBS contains an array of 
questions related to an individual’s social capital, as well as demographic and household 
economic information. It does not however include labor market status information outside of 
whether a person is in the labor force or not.  
 The long form DC was administered to approximately 10% of US households. Unlike the 
short form, the long form contains information outside of basic demographics, such as detailed 
labor market information. The DC contains millions of observations. While the DC is much 
larger than the SCCBS it is still possible to use the SCCBS to predict social capital through a 
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process described in the next section because both contain similar information. Summary 
statistics for the DC will be discussed below. 
IV. Methodology 
 Social capital and entrepreneurship are not both observed in a single survey or data set. 
Therefore, everyone in the DC must be assigned an estimated measure of their social capital of 
different types. The next three subsections describe the methodology employed to calculate both 
individual and community levels of trust social capital, and weak and strong network social 
capital. The last two subsections describe the methodology used to investigate social capital’s 
influence on entrepreneurial outcomes.  
 Two-Sample Two-Stage Least Squares (2S2SLS) is commonly used to overcome the 
problem of missing data in the primary data set. This type of instrumental procedure was first 
developed by Klevmarken (1982) as an estimation strategy for variables that are not contained 
within a single sample (also see Ridder and Moffitt 2007). One of the most well-known 
applications of two-sample instrumental variable estimation comes from Angrist and Krueger 
(1992). In their analysis, Angrist and Krueger estimate the effect of age at school entry on 
educational outcomes. Since age at school entry and educational attainment are not contained 
within a single sample, the authors employ two-sample instrumental variables. This predicament 
is similar to the one faced here -- the DC does not contain information on social capital but does 
contain the outcomes of interest, namely the labor market status of an individual.  The Social 
Capital Community Benchmark Survey (SCCBS), described above, is used to obtain predictors 
10 
 
of social capital at the individual level that will be applied to observations in the DC. This multi-
step procedure is described below.5  
 IV.A. Estimating Social Capital for Observations in the DC and CPS 
 The basic strategy is to estimate a social capital determining equation using the SCCBS, 
then use those parameters to predict multiple dimensions of social capital for observations in the 
DC. The next three sub-subsections describe the three steps needed to estimate social capital. 
 IV.A.i. Reweighting the SCCBS 
 The first step in applying Two-Sample Two-Stage least squares (2S2SLS) to get 
parameters with which to predict social capital in the DC is to make sure both the predicting data 
set (SCCBS) and the data set for which predictions are made (DC) have a common set of 
variables and to construct weights for use in the estimation that make the two data sets look 
similar (at least at the means). Inverse probability weighting (see DiNardo et al. 1996) is used to 
make the SCCBS more similar to the DC. The SCCBS is appended to the DC and the following 
equation is estimated using logistic regressions: 
! "#$%&'()*"+,* ∈ .//0., 1) = 4 15# .,,  (1) 
The parameter estimates from this regression are then used to construct the inverse probability 
ratio, 7 8
9:
;<,7 89:
,, for each observation in the SCCBS. This is the re-weighting function used to 
modify the individual weights provided in the SCCBS.6 
                                                
5 The 2S2SLS methodology described in this analysis follows the methodology implemented by 
Hotchkiss and Rupasingha (2018). The authors in this paper measured the determinants of social 
capital in a similar fashion but estimate different types of social capital than are estimated in this 
paper.  
6 Parameters from the re-weighting exercise have not been disclosed but don't show anything out 
of the ordinary. 
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 IV.A.ii. Identifying a Person’s Unobserved Social Capital through Factor Analysis. 
 Since social capital is not a characteristic that is observed, the next step is to create 
measures of social capital for individuals in the SCCBS. This is done using factor analysis 
designed to capture a common social capital characteristic (e.g., weak network, strong network, 
or trust) exhibited by an individual participating in certain activities or exhibiting particular 
attitudes. For example, questions related to generalized trust, trust of people in their 
neighborhood, and trust amongst working colleagues, among others, are used to construct a 
person's level of trust social capital.  Questions related to membership status in various 
organizations such as in art groups, neighborhood associations, as well as information on 
whether an individual volunteered in activities that are unrelated to membership in any group, 
are used to construct a person's level of weak network social capital. A measure of strong 
network social capital is constructed from information about connections and interactions with 
friends and families. Table I details each of the components that are combined, through factor 
analysis, to construct a single measure for each social capital characteristic. 
 Factor analysis elicits the common factor from responses to multiple questions in the 
SCCBS about activities related to a specific measure of social capital in order to uncover a 
person's latent degree of social capital. From this analysis, I obtain a single factor values for each 
person for each type of social capital. For each measure of social capital, the factor is essentially 
a linear combination of the original variables (responses to survey questions) combined to reflect 
the person's latent social capital level. 
 IV.A.iii. Estimating the Determinants of Social Capital. 
 Once measures for each type of social capital for each person in the SCCBS are obtained, 
the way in which observable characteristics are related to the measured level of social capital are 
obtained. These social capital "factor" values are not easily interpretable, but they are ordinal by 
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construct. So, the distribution of their values is split into three levels--high, medium, and low--
which are then used to estimate an ordered logit to determine the relationship between a person's 
observable characteristics and their level of each type of social capital. For all types of social 
capital considered, the process of estimating social capital is the same.  
 The probability that individual *, living in census tract =, has social capital level > (low, 
medium, or high) of type ? (? = trust, weak network, strong network) is formally expressed as: 
! .@AB
C = > = !&(EF<; < HI + K;1AB + KLMB + EAB), (2) 
Where .@AB
C  is the social capital of type ? of person i who lives in census tract =. 1AB are 
individual characteristics such as race, ethnicity, marital status as well as regional dummies.  MB 
are regressors that are unique to the equation. These include the distance-weighted average of 
nearby census tract characteristics, such as the labor participation rate, the percentage of 
homeowners, the percent of households with children in the home, etc. The full list of Census 
tract controls is in Appendix Table AI.  These census tract variables are constructed using the 
2000 DC. In order to address the potential endogeneity of the characteristics in which an 
individual lives and their level of social capital, MB actually includes the average of these 
characteristics in surrounding census tracts inversely weighted by distance from an individual’s 
own census tract. The parameters from the ordered logit are then used to estimate where each 
respondent in the DC lies in each social capital measure's distribution (whether the respondent is 
expected to have a low, medium, or high level of trust, for example). For the full set of 
parameters in both 1AB and MB see Appendix Table AI.  
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 IV.B. Probability of Entrepreneurship 
 The first analysis assesses the role of individual and community social capital, along with 
other individual and community characteristics, in observing self-employment, paid 
employment, or not in the labor force: 
! N"&>%&/O($$AB = P = Q(1AB, .@AB = ℎ*Tℎ, .@B = ℎ*Tℎ, 1B, UAB),, (3) 
where WorkerClass is the labor market status of person i in census tract c (m = 1 is not in labor 
force, 2 is in labor force in paid employment, and 3 is in the labor force and self-employed); 1AB 
is a O,V,1 vector of individual characteristics, such as race, education, and measures of household 
income; .@AB = ℎ*Tℎ is equal to one if the person has a level of social capital that is in the top 
third of the distribution for that social capital measure; .@B = ℎ*Tℎ is equal to one if the 
community's average level of social capital is in the top third of the distribution of that social 
capital measure across communities; and 1B are average census tract characteristics, such as the 
unemployment rate. Community level social capital is a distance-weighted average of individual 
social capital measures in surrounding census tracts, reducing any potential endogeneity with 
one’s individual social capital. Table II list summary statistics for variables used to estimate 
equation (3). To avoid likely collinearity between the types of social capital, equation (3) is 
estimated separately for each type of social capital. For instance, there are elements of inherent 
trust in a person’s strong network. Additionally, a person may be trusting and, therefore, more 
likely to form a large weak network. I focus on levels of high social capital in order to ease 
interpretation of its effects compared to low and medium social capital. 
 It is assumed that, conditional on observed community and individual characteristics, a 
person chooses the labor market status that maximizes their utility. An individual choosing self-
employment will do so because it dominates the other options -- paid employment and being out 
of the labor force (see Patrick et al. 2016). By estimating equation (3) as a multinomial logit 
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model, the correlation between the utility from the three options is accounted for. This approach 
also means that regressors unique to a selection equation in a standard Heckman selection model 
are not required; it is often difficult to justify the exogeneity of such regressors. Equation (3) is 
also estimated separately for natives and immigrant individuals, individuals in rural, suburban, 
and urban tracts, gender, and education.7  
 The analysis here examines similar types of social capital using similar measurement 
strategies (types of questions considered) as Kwon et al. (2013), however it differs in three ways. 
First, I perform factor analysis on groups of questions in order to derive a measure of the relevant 
types of social capital. This allows me to quantify a person’s latent social capital.  Second, the 
analysis incorporates both individual and community social capital measures. Finally, whereas 
Kwon et al. (2013) assigns community average responses (at the PUMA-level) from the SCCBS 
to the decennial census individual respondents, I estimate social capital measures for each 
individual separately, based on their individual characteristics and then aggregate to the census 
tract (community) level. This improves on a community measure of social capital because 
community social capital is directly related to all members of that community (every person in 
the Decennial Census) at a more targeted geographic area (a census tract) as opposed to the 
average responses of a small amount of people in a very large geographic area (SCCBS 
respondents in their corresponding PUMA).8    
                                                
7 Rural, suburban, and urban census tract status are determined by a census tract’s RUCA code 
from the ERS. See here for more information: https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/rural-
urban-commuting-area-codes/ 
8 The prediction of social capital is off of a small sample, but that sample is reweighted to better 
match the distribution of the larger sample, therefore still improving on the estimates of social 
capital for individuals in the Decennial Census.  
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V. Results and Discussion 
 V.A. First Stage: Social Capital Estimation 
 The first-stage ordered logit results corresponding to equation (2) are found in Appendix 
Table AI. These results tell us how observed individual and census tract characteristics are 
related to a person's measure of each type of social capital. I identify variation in social capital 
utilizing exogenous census tract characteristics such as distance-weighted average of nearby 
Census Tracts’ share of jobs in social occupations, the unemployment rate, and population 
density. Each column of coefficients in Appendix Table AI represents a separate regression.  For 
trust, the statistically significant identifying census tract characteristics are the unemployment 
rate, median age, and share of families with children. The share of workers in “social” industries 
and the share of people who lived in the community at least 5 years identifies weak network 
social capital. Finally, strong network social capital is identified by the unemployment rate, the 
female labor force participation rate and the share of college graduates. For each social capital 
equation, the pseudo R2 is within the range of goodness of fit reported by Hotchkiss and 
Rupasingha (2018) from their identical ordered logit. Others using an ordinary least squares 
methodology in the first-stage report goodness of fit measures between 0.01 and 0.604  (Currie 
and Yelowitz 2000; Dee and Evans 2003; Nicoletti and Ermisch 2008; Cavaglia 2015). 
 At the individual level, one of the most striking statistically significant determinants of 
trust is the role of race. Minorities are statistically less trusting than White, non-Hispanics (NH). 
This is consistent with differences in trust between White, NH and minorities as detailed in Price 
(2012). Additionally, individual educational attainment (not accounting for the interaction terms) 
suggests increases the amount of social capital a person has? while recent migration to a location 
decreases the amount of social capital one has, consistent with Rupasingha et al. (2006).  
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 The coefficients in Appendix Table A-I are what is applied to the DC in order to 
construct an estimate of unobserved social capital.  
 V.B. Second Stage: Social Capital and Self-Employment in the Full Sample 
 Tables III through VIII present the multinomial logit average marginal effects (AME) 
from estimating equation (3) separately for each social capital measure, for the full sample and 
then for different sub-samples of the population. I present the AME as opposed to the regression 
coefficients due to multinomial logit regression coefficients being sensitive to the chosen base 
category.  For completeness, average marginal effects for all labor market outcomes are reported. 
I first consider the results for the primary sample, which includes all civilian persons between the 
ages of 18-64. This sample has approximately 20,540,000 persons. Individuals are split among 
the three worker classes: Not Working (~3,852,000 million), Paid-Employed (~15,040,000 
million), and Self-Employed (1,668,000). 
 V.B.i. Trust and Self-Employment 
 Focusing first on the role of trust, an individual with a high (relative to medium or low) 
level of trust social capital has a lower probability of being observed in self-employment by 0.31 
percentage points as seen in Table III. At first glance, this might seem counterintuitive. However, 
individuals with high levels of trust may believe that society will take care of them in a non-
working state (hence, more likely to be non-working). The marginal effect for self-employed is 
significantly smaller than that of paid-employment, suggesting that while individuals with high 
trust are less likely to be in either paid or self-employment, those who are working are more 
likely to be self-employed than in paid employment. These results illustrate why accounting for 
selection into the labor market is important. If the analysis excluded non-workers, we would 
conclude that promoting high levels of individual trust social capital would increase 
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entrepreneurial activity. However, doing so would actually increase not working at the cost of 
both paid and self-employment. 
 Community trust does not appear to be a strong predictor of self-employment. This result 
is in direct contrast to Kwon et al. (2013), who finds a significant and positive association for 
trust in observing a person in a state of self-employment. One possible reason for this 
discrepancy is that here a community is a census tract, whereas Kwon et al. measure the 
community at the PUMA level, a much larger, and less precise, measure of community. 
Additionally, Kwon et al. do not include individual levels of social capital and do not account for 
the possibility of not working as a labor market choice.  
 V.B.ii. Weak Network and Self-Employment 
 Table IV presents the average marginal effects of weak network social capital on 
employment status. In contrast to trust, those with high levels of weak network social capital are 
more likely to be in both paid and self-employment, relative to those with medium or low levels 
of weak network social capital. A person with a large weak network is likely to be involved in 
many social groups or spend time volunteering. A large weak network provides a mechanism for 
information to more freely flow, increasing knowledge of potential employment/business 
opportunities. Additionally, a large weak network could also act as a consumer base for an 
entrepreneur. Since the marginal effect of high individual weak network social capital for paid 
employment (0.0087) is higher than the marginal effect for self-employment (0.0065), this 
suggests that weak networks may prove more marginally more valuable to finding paid 
employment opportunities than self-employment opportunities.   
 The story is different for individuals who are in communities with high levels of weak 
network social capital. An individual who lives in a community where it is common to be very 
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involved in social activities and volunteering is 0.53 percentage points more likely to be self-
employed than someone in a community with medium or low levels of weak network social 
capital. However, that individual is no more or less likely to be in paid employment or not 
working. A high level of weak network social capital within the community appears to provide 
an individual with resources important for promoting entrepreneurial activity, such as a more 
connected community acting as a potential customer base.  This result is consistent with the 
results from Kwon et al. (2013), who also find a positive effect of weak network social capital on 
self-employment.    
 V.B.iii. Second Stage: Strong Network and Self-Employment 
 A person’s strong network is quantified by the number of close friends and family they 
have as well as the nature in which that person interacts with these close relationships. The 
results in Table V suggest that individuals with a high (vs. medium or low) level of strong 
network social capital are more likely to be not working and less likely to be both self-employed 
and in paid employment, much like the effect of high levels of trust social capital. It would make 
sense that high levels of trust and high levels of strong network social capital might have similar 
effects, as strong family and friend ties might tend to make someone more trustful. These results 
suggest that a large strong network provides more support for not working than either 
employment outcome. 
 Relative to paid employment, individual high levels of strong network social capital is 
associated with a higher probability of self-employment -- high levels of strong network social 
capital reduces the probability of self-employment by about one percentage point, whereas it 
reduces the probability of paid employment by nearly eight percentage points. This suggests that 
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if working a large strong network offers more support/resources for pursuing self-employment 
rather than paid employment.  
 Again, juxtaposing these results for strong network with those for trust social capital, we 
see an interesting difference. Like higher levels of community trust social capital, higher levels 
of community strong network social capital reduce the probability of not working. However, 
whereas that reduction in the not working probability as community trust increases is absorbed 
by a rise in the probability of paid employment, higher community strong network social capital 
increase self-employment. This suggests that a strong networked community can offer a more 
stable environment for a person wanting to pursue entrepreneurial activities such as self-
employment. In other words, community trust is more important in seeking paid employment, 
whereas a strong network within the community is more important in promoting self-
employment. 
 V.B.iv. Other Determinants of Labor Market Status 
 In addition to a person's individual or community level social capital, labor market status 
is influenced by a number of other factors. This section briefly discusses how these factors 
influence a person’s worker class as seen in Tables III-V. Consistent with Kerr and Kerr (2016), 
immigrants are more likely to be self-employed than natives.  Females are much less likely than 
males to be self-employed, a finding consistent with Patrick et al. (2016). While there is often a 
belief that the older one is the less likely they will have a successful business, current literature 
finds that success of an entrepreneur is positively correlated with age (Azoulay et al. 2018). Here 
I also find increases in age increase the likelihood of being observed in self-employment.  White, 
non-Hispanics are more likely to be self-employed than minorities. Homeownership and a 
college education also increase the likelihood an individual is self-employed.  
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 In addition to community social capital measures, other community measures such as the 
unemployment rate and population density are found to matter in the likelihood an individual is 
observed as self-employed. Higher unemployment rates decrease the likelihood an individual is 
self-employed while population density increases that likelihood. While higher unemployment 
rates indicate an individual is less likely to enter self-employment, the marginal effect is 
significantly smaller in magnitude than the corresponding ME for paid-employment. Given that 
this study is for 2000 and the US was at the tail end of an expansion, it is plausible that under 
more adverse macroeconomic effects such as a recession, that increases in the unemployment 
rate would increase the likelihood of self-employment relative to paid-employment.  
 V.C. Second Stage: Social Capital and Self-Employment in Population Subsamples 
 This section stratifies the full sample across various demographic and geographic 
dimensions: immigrant status, urbanicity of community, gender, and educational attainment. The 
empirical strategy is unchanged. Furthermore, for brevity, I only report average marginal effect 
of the social capital variables. For each of the subsample analyses I estimate a separate 
regression for each social capital type but only focus on the most striking differences between 
the various subsamples for discussion.  
 V.C.i. Immigrants vs. Natives 
  Immigrants are defined as individuals who are neither a U.S. citizen nor a naturalized 
U.S. citizen. Table VI presents the marginal effects of each type of social capital on labor market 
status probabilities for the immigrants and natives separately. The marginal effects for natives for 
all social capital types, at both the individual and community levels, are consistently similar to 
the marginal effects for the full sample seen in Tables III-V.  Immigrants with high levels of 
weak network social capital have a statistically larger likelihood of self-employment, relative to 
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their counterparts with medium or low weak levels, than natives (1.3 percentage points vs 0.42 
percentage points). In fact, for all employment states with respect to high individual weak 
network social capital, the marginal effect is larger for immigrants than natives. Immigrants’ 
weak network may be acting as a substitute to institutions that may be unavailable to themselves. 
In his study of immigrant populations in the Netherlands, Lancee (2010) also finds weak network 
social capital positively associated with employment outcomes. Additionally, the aforementioned 
study also finds no connection between trust and employment outcomes.  
 The lack of statistical significance of all community measures of social capital for 
immigrants is puzzling.  Perhaps the census tract, which is the level at which I measure 
community, is not the appropriate geography to capture an immigrants "community."  Immigrant 
enclaves are often in very large cities and therefore a census tract in these areas are quite large 
which may be why community network social capital measures are statistically insignificant.9 
 V.C.ii. Urban vs. Rural 
 Results in Table VII come from stratifying the sample on the urban and rural status of the 
community in which a person lives.10  These results show persons in urban communities 
generally follow the standard observational pattern as the full sample. The most striking 
difference between urban and rural residents is related to weak network social capital. Higher 
levels of both individual and community weak network social capital are much more strongly 
associated with a higher probability of self-employment among rural residents than among urban 
residents, indicating that a high individual and community weak network is much more valuable 
                                                
9 U.S. Immigrant Population by Metropolitan Area 
10 Urban/Rural status is determined by its Rural Urban Classification Area codes from the 
Economic Research Service. Urban census tract is one that has a RUCA code from between 1 
and 2. A rural census tract has a RUCA code between 9 and 10. Generally, urban census tracts 
are also tracts in MSAs while rural census tracts are generally outside of MSAs.  
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to a person in a rural environment than an urban environment. Therefore, while a person in an 
urban setting is 0.6 percentage points more likely to be self-employed if they have a large weak 
network, a person in the rural community is 1.2 percentage points more likely to become self-
employed. While, in magnitude much smaller, this effect is consistent with Bauernschuster et al. 
(2010) mark-up effect of weak network social capital. Differences in urbanicity also show that 
rural communities with large strong networks increase the likelihood of self-employment while 
those same types of communities in urban areas do not. More so, the marginal effects across all 
labor market statuses is much larger (as large as 4 times the size) in rural communities with 
respect to a community with high strong network social capital.  Again, strong connections in 
rural communities, with potentially fewer formal institutions, appears to be an important tool in 
entrepreneurial pursuits when other options, such as paid employment, may be harder to come 
by. In other words, social capital is potentially more salient and valuable in the most rural 
communities.  
 V.C.iii. Women vs. Men 
 Table VIII stratifies the main sample by gender. The most striking difference between 
men and women is the opposite importance of individual vs. community levels of weak network 
social capital. Whereas high levels of individual weak network social capital are more important 
than community level weak network social capital in increasing the probability of self-
employment among men, the opposite is true for women. The relatively larger importance of 
community weak network social capital for women is consistent with Patrick et al. (2016) who 
find that community gender attitudes and the local business climate, generally, play important 
roles in women's decision to become self-employed.  These results are also consistent with Allen 
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(2000), who finds women “receive less influential social support (akin to this works measure of 
network social capital) for entrepreneurial activity.” 
 The importance of community for women's employment status decisions also shows up 
in the importance, relative to men, of community level trust and community level strong network 
social capital. Whereas high levels of both community trust and strong network social capital are 
important for women choosing between paid employment a non-working, they are unrelated to 
that choice for men.  
 V.C.iv. College vs. non-College Graduates 
 Finally, Table IX details the results by individuals with a college degree and individuals 
without a college degree. The most notable difference between non-college and college 
graduates is in the role that weak network social capital plays in determining self-employment. 
High levels of both individual and community weak network social capital are more important 
among college graduates than among non-college graduates. The college environment provides 
individuals opportunities to build long-term networks through various groups and volunteering 
organizations.  
 For non-college educated individuals living in a community with a large amount of 
strong network social capital, the probability of self-employment is larger than for college 
educated individuals in the same type of community. Less educated individuals face more 
migration constraints and therefore less likely to move (Molloy et al., 2011). As a result, the 
value of strong bonded community to non-college adults appears to be a stronger predictor of 
self-employment as shown by a larger marginal effect for this group.  
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VI. Conclusion  
 I examine the role of both individual and community level (census tract) social capital in 
the determination of self-employment as well as other labor market outcomes. The methodology 
used here accounts for selection into the labor force, making the results more generalizable. The 
restricted Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey is used to predict three types of 
unobserved social capital for respondents in the restricted US 2000 Decennial Census using a 
two-sample two stage least squares framework: trust, weak network, and strong network. By 
utilizing the richness of the Decennial Census, the analyses in this paper covers over 20 million 
people and is nationally representative. This improves upon prior literature that primarily 
focused on targeted populations in order to study the relationship between social capital and 
entrepreneurship (see Stam et al., 2014). Furthermore, I am able to measure social capital at a 
finer geographic level than has been previously measured due to the nature of my data.  
 I find most measures of social capital are statistically significant in determining a person's 
self-employment status (vs. paid-employment and not working). Individuals with high levels of 
trust are found to be less likely to enter self-employment, relative to not-working, but relatively 
more likely to be self-employed relative to paid employment. However, individuals living in 
communities with high levels of social trust are not found to be statistically more likely to enter 
self-employment.  
 Both individual and community measures of weak networks are found to statistically 
increase the likelihood of self-employment. These results are consistent with the way weak 
networks generally operate: the larger one's weak network (consisting of casual contacts), the 
more information is available to exploit potential business opportunities. This is particularly true 
for women, college graduates, and rural residents. Meanwhile, a person with a large strong 
network is less likely to be self-employed (and less likely to be in paid employment), and this 
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holds across all subsamples. A strong network consisting of family and friends may make the 
value of not working higher than being in either paid or self-employment. Contrastingly, a 
community that is very close-knit can provide moral support to an individual pursuing the risky 
endeavor of self-employment, and, in fact, the results indicate that high levels of community 
strong networks increases the likelihood of self-employment. This result holds in the subsamples 
for natives, rural residents, females, and both college and non-college graduates. 
 The most consistent result across various economic and demographic stratifications is 
importance of weak network social capital. When thinking about potential policy implications of 
this work, one can’t help but see a potential connection between formation of social capital in 
rural communities and better employment opportunities for people in these communities. Self-
employment in non-metro/rural areas is particularly important for economic growth (Stephens 
and Partridge 2011).  Policy makers considering potential place-based policy in these regions can 
use the importance of weak networks in their policy designs in order to spur self-employment. 
The importance of high levels of weak social capital (at both the individual and community 
level) in increasing self-employment is nearly twice as high in rural communities versus urban 
communities. The importance of weak network social capital (both at the individual and census 
tract level) in self-employment decisions in rural areas might offer a promising option for 
policymaking in terms of how to potentially address the poor paid-employment prospects in rural 
America.11 Increasing social interactions in communities through the promotion of social capital 
building entities like clubs and social groups etc. may be an innovative and low-cost intervention 
for communities with few paid job opportunities.  
                                                
11 Rural Employment and Unemployment 
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 Future work will expand this analysis, using the 2000 Current Population Survey March 
Supplement, to examine how social capital influences the transition from paid employment to 
self-employment. This extension is motivated from work by Hotchkiss and Rupasingha (2018b) 
who find that social capital is influential in the decision behind occupational choice. This 
analysis will explore the relative importance of previous work experience and social capital in 
the determination of entrepreneurial activity. In observing an individual's transition from paid 
employment to self-employment, I will be able to explore how social capital influences people 
entering entrepreneurship after previously being in a paid employment position. This 
supplements the current analysis by examining how social capital predicts who becomes an 
entrepreneur.  
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Tables 
Table I: Factor Analysis of Social Capital Questions 
Trust Weak Network Strong Network 
“Can trust others” “Participate in charity or 
social welfare organization” 
“Number of close friends” 
“Trust neighbors” “Participate in professional, 
trade, farm, or business 
organization” 
“Number of people you can 
confide in” 
“Trust co-workers” “Participate in political 
group”  
“Number of times you’ve had 
friends over to your home” 
“Trust shop clerks” “Participate in literary, art, or 
musical group” 
“Number of times you have 
visited with relatives” 
“Trust local police” “Participate in hobby, 
investment, or garden club” 
“Number of times you have 
hung with friends in a public 
place” 
“Trust local news” “Participate in neighborhood 
association” 
 
Composite racial trust “Frequency of times 
volunteered” 
 
*These are questions from the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey 
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Table II: Chapter I Summary Statistics 
Variable Not 
Working 
Paid 
Employment 
Self-
Employed 
Social Capital    
High Weak Network- Individual 0.17 0.2652 0.342 
 [0.3757] [0.4414] [0.4744] 
High Weak Network- Community 0.04047 0.04791 0.05009 
 [0.1971] [0.2136] [0.2181] 
High Strong Network- Individual 0.3582 0.3212 0.2053 
 [0.4795] [0.467] [0.4039] 
High Strong Network- Community 0.1159 0.1348 0.1559 
 [0.3201] [0.3416] [0.3628] 
High Trust Individual 0.235 0.3071 0.4218 
 [0.424] [0.4613] [0.4938] 
High Trust Community 0.1902 0.2212 0.2364 
 [0.3925] [0.4151] [0.4249] 
Individual Controls     
Income greater or equal to $30,000 0.6888 0.7864 0.8037 
 [0.463] [0.4098] [0.3972] 
Married 0.5614 0.6049 0.7518 
 [0.4962] [0.4889] [0.432] 
Age 38.74 38.82 44.16 
 [13.91] [11.71] [10.4] 
Age Squared 1695 1644 2058 
 [1135] [933.4] [909.3] 
Immigrant 0.1578 0.1121 0.1159 
 [0.3645] [0.3155] [0.3201] 
Live in area less than 5 Years 0.3364 0.3227 0.2474 
 [0.4725] [0.4675] [0.4315] 
Female 0.5897 0.4925 0.3518 
 [0.4919] [0.4999] [0.4775] 
Black, NH 0.1288 0.09135 0.03989 
 [0.335] [0.2881] [0.1957] 
White, NH 0.6558 0.7589 0.842 
 [0.4751] [0.4277] [0.3648] 
Hispanic 0.1495 0.09629 0.06538 
 [0.3566] [0.295] [0.2472] 
Asian, Other, Non-Hispanic 0.06594 0.05346 0.05277 
 [0.2482] [0.2249] [0.2236] 
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Variable Not 
Working 
Paid 
Employment 
Self-
Employed 
Less than High School 0.252 0.1301 0.1204 
 [0.4341] [0.3364] [0.3254] 
High School 0.3161 0.2946 0.2741 
 [0.4649] [0.4558] [0.446] 
Some College 0.2825 0.3175 0.2995 
 [0.4502] [0.4655] [0.458] 
College Grad 0.1495 0.2578 0.3061 
 [0.3565] [0.4374] [0.4609] 
Owns Home 0.6931 0.7467 0.8222 
 [0.4612] [0.4349] [0.3824] 
Census Tract Controls    
Unemployment Rate 0.02114 0.01937 0.01846 
 [0.01284] [0.0113] [0.01056] 
Median Household Income $49,960 $54,210 $59,030 
 [21590] [21600] [26620] 
Population Density 2.092 1.715 1.477 
 [5.344] [4.567] [4.552] 
Number of Observations 3,852,000 15,040,000 1,668,000 
*Note means are unweighted. Individuals are ages 16-64 and not classified as working in the 
military. Sample sizes are approximate in keeping with disclosure guidelines.  
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Table III: Multinomial Logit- Average Marginal Effects; Trust 
 Trust 
Variables Not Working Paid 
Employment 
Self-
Employed 
Social Capital     
High Individual  Social 
Capital 
0.0141*** -0.0110*** -0.0031*** 
 [0.0032] [0.0031] [0.0007] 
High Community Social 
Capital 
-0.0163*** 0.0137** 0.0026 
 [0.0047] [0.0059] [0.0028] 
Individual 
Characteristics 
   
Household total income 
GE $30,000 
-0.0433*** 0.0484*** -0.0051*** 
 [0.0016] [0.0020] [0.0006] 
Married 0.0106*** -0.0289*** 0.0183*** 
 [0.0012] [0.0016] [0.0012] 
Age -0.0242*** 0.0125*** 0.0117*** 
 [0.0007] [0.0008] [0.0002] 
Age squared 0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** 
 [8.84e-06] [9.49e-06] [2.50e-06] 
Immigrant 0.0128** -0.0272*** 0.0144*** 
 [0.0056] [0.0053] [0.0010] 
Lived in area 5 yrs. or 
less 
0.0232*** -0.0089*** -0.0143*** 
 [0.0017] [0.0015] [0.0005] 
Female 0.0760*** -0.0337*** -0.0423*** 
 [0.0025] [0.0025] [0.0013] 
Black, non-Hispanic 0.0135*** 0.0156** -0.0291*** 
 [0.0046] [0.0065] [0.0023] 
White, non-Hispanic -0.0393*** 0.0246*** 0.0147*** 
 [0.0040] [0.0065] [0.0029] 
Hispanic -0.0036 0.0225*** -0.0189*** 
 [0.0039] [0.0051] [0.0026] 
High school education -0.0530*** 0.0530*** 0.0000574 
 [0.0015] [0.0018] [0.0008] 
Some college education -0.0707*** 0.0645*** 0.0062*** 
 [0.0017] [0.0020] [0.0009] 
College graduate -0.0956*** 0.0777*** 0.0180*** 
 [0.0020] [0.0026] [0.0012] 
Own home -0.0026*** -0.0088*** 0.0114*** 
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 Trust 
Variables Not Working Paid 
Employment 
Self-
Employed 
 [0.0009] [0.0016] [0.0010] 
Census Tract Controls    
Unemployment Rate 0.5355*** -0.4876*** -0.0479** 
 [0.0264] [0.0325] [0.0188] 
Median Household 
Income 
-1.78e-07*** -3.77e-07*** 5.55e-07*** 
 [3.56e-08] [4.03e-08] [1.88e-08] 
Population Density 0.0008*** -0.0011*** 0.0004*** 
 [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0001] 
Note: Regressions include occupation and MSA fixed effects.  
Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table IV: Multinomial Logit-Average Marginal Effects; Weak Network 
 Weak Network 
Variables Not Working Paid 
Employment 
Self-
Employed 
Social Capital     
High Individual Social 
Capital -0.0152*** 0.0087*** 0.0065*** 
 [0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0011] 
High Community Social 
Capital -0.0038 -0.0015 0.0053*** 
 [0.0043] [0.0053] [0.0014] 
Individual 
Characteristics    
Household total income 
GE $30,000 -0.0403*** 0.0468*** -0.0065*** 
 [0.0017] [0.0021] [0.0006] 
Married 0.0120*** -0.0300*** 0.0179*** 
 [0.0013] [0.0016] [0.0013] 
Age -0.0246*** 0.0128*** 0.0118*** 
 [0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0002] 
Age squared 0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** 
 [8.13e-06] [9.01e-06] [2.48e-06] 
Immigrant 0.0119** -0.0270*** 0.0151*** 
 [0.0057] [0.0054] [0.0010] 
Lived in area 5 yrs. or 
less 0.0204*** -0.0072*** -0.0132*** 
 [0.0018] [0.0015] [0.0007] 
Female 0.0769*** -0.0343*** -0.0426*** 
 [0.0026] [0.0026] [0.0013] 
Black, non-Hispanic 0.0181*** 0.0124* -0.0305*** 
 [0.0051] [0.0068] [0.0021] 
White, non-Hispanic -0.0350*** 0.0218*** 0.0132*** 
 [0.0047] [0.0069] [0.0027] 
Hispanic -0.0006 0.0206*** -0.0200*** 
 [0.0039] [0.0052] [0.0024] 
High school education -0.0530*** 0.0529*** 0.0001 
 [0.0014] [0.0018] [0.0008] 
Some college education -0.0667*** 0.0625*** 0.0042*** 
 [0.0019] [0.0023] [0.0009] 
College graduate -0.0826*** 0.0711*** 0.0116*** 
 [0.0023] [0.0031] [0.0017] 
Own home -0.0007 -0.0100*** 0.0107*** 
 [0.0010] [0.0016] [0.0011] 
Census Tract Controls    
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 Weak Network 
Variables Not Working Paid 
Employment 
Self-
Employed 
Unemployment Rate 0.5460*** -0.4953*** -0.0506*** 
 [0.0276] [0.0326] [0.0180] 
Median Household 
Income -1.65e-07*** -3.82e-07*** 5.47e-07*** 
 [3.89e-08] [4.26e-08] [1.86e-08] 
Population Density 0.0008*** -0.0011*** 0.0003*** 
 [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0001] 
Note: Regressions include occupation and MSA fixed effects.  
Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table V: Multinomial Logit- Average Marginal Effects; Strong Network 
 Strong Network 
Variables Not Working Paid 
Employment 
Self-
Employed 
Social Capital     
High Individual Social 
Capital 0.0864*** -0.0756*** -0.0109*** 
 [0.0050] [0.0047] [0.0009] 
High Community Social 
Capital -0.0214*** 0.0123 0.0091*** 
 [0.0067] [0.0076] [0.0032] 
Individual 
Characteristics    
Household total income 
GE $30,000 -0.0536*** 0.0577*** -0.0041*** 
 [0.0025] [0.0027] [0.0004] 
Married 0.0152*** -0.0328*** 0.0176*** 
 [0.0013] [0.0015] [0.0012] 
Age -0.0173*** 0.0065*** 0.0108*** 
 [0.0005] [0.0006] [0.0003] 
Age squared 0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 [6.25e-06] [7.40e-06] [3.00e-06] 
Immigrant 0.0184*** -0.0325*** 0.0141*** 
 [0.0058] [0.0054] [0.0010] 
Lived in area 5 yrs. or 
less 0.0341*** -0.0185*** -0.0155*** 
 [0.0020] [0.0018] [0.0006] 
Female 0.0724*** -0.0305*** -0.0419*** 
 [0.0025] [0.0026] [0.0012] 
Black, non-Hispanic 0.0164*** 0.0125* -0.0289*** 
 [0.0051] [0.0069] [0.0023] 
White, non-Hispanic -0.0584*** 0.0423*** 0.0162*** 
 [0.0055] [0.0076] [0.0026] 
Hispanic -0.0024 0.0213*** -0.0189*** 
 [0.0040] [0.0051] [0.0026] 
High school education -0.0555*** 0.0558*** -0.0003 
 [0.0020] [0.0022] [0.0008] 
Some college education -0.0835*** 0.0764*** 0.0071*** 
 [0.0030] [0.0031] [0.0010] 
College graduate -0.1039*** 0.0862*** 0.0176*** 
 [0.0026] [0.0028] [0.0014] 
Own home 0.0012* -0.0115*** 0.0103*** 
 [0.0007] [0.0015] [0.0010] 
Census Tract Controls    
35 
 
 Strong Network 
Variables Not Working Paid 
Employment 
Self-
Employed 
Unemployment Rate 0.5471*** -0.5012*** -0.0459** 
 [0.0277] [0.0329] [0.0184] 
Median Household 
Income -1.59e-07*** -3.92e-07*** 5.51e-07*** 
 [4.61e-08] [4.94e-08] [1.80e-08] 
Population Density 0.0006*** -0.0010*** 0.0004*** 
 [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0001] 
Note: Regressions include occupation and MSA fixed effects.  
Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table VI: Immigration and Social Capital 
 Immigrants Natives 
Variables Not  
Working 
Paid Employment Self-Employment Not Working Paid Employment Self-
Employment 
Trust  
      
High 
Individual 
-0.0015 0.0023 -0.0008 0.0202*** -0.0162*** -0.0041*** 
 [0.0056] [0.0039] [0.0024] [0.0036] [0.0034] [0.0008] 
High 
Community  
0.0013 0.0007 -0.0019 -0.0172*** 0.0143** 0.0029 
 [0.0059] [0.0060] [0.0023] [0.0047] [0.0059] [0.0029] 
Weak 
Network       
High 
Individual  
-0.0449*** 0.0316*** 0.0133*** -0.0064*** 0.0022 0.0042*** 
 [0.0031] [0.0030] [0.0014] [0.0017] [0.0019] [0.0009] 
High 
Community 
0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0052 -0.0008 0.0060*** 
 [0.0053] [0.0056] [0.0053] [0.0046] [0.0059] [0.0020] 
Strong 
Network       
High 
Individual  
0.0979*** -0.0823*** -0.0156*** 0.0929*** -0.0814*** -0.0115*** 
 [0.0024] [0.0026] [0.0012] [0.0048] [0.0048] [0.0009] 
High 
Community 
0.0042 -0.0004 -0.0038 -0.0223*** 0.0128* 0.0095*** 
 [0.0087] [0.0075] [0.0043] [0.0066] [0.0077] [0.0032] 
Observation
s N=2,488,000   N=18,070,000   
*Each measure of social capital is from a separate regression. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level. Each model 
contains the same controls detailed in Table III but are not repeated here for brevity.  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table VII: Urban, Rural Status and Social Capital 
 Urban Rural 
Variables Not Working Paid Employment Self-Employment Not Working Paid Employment Self-
Employment 
Trust  
      
High Individual  0.0196*** -0.0164*** -0.0032*** -0.0081 0.0098* -0.0018 
 [0.0029] [0.0028] [0.0006] [0.0059] [0.0058] [0.0029] 
High 
Community 
-0.0128*** 0.0108*** 0.0021 -0.0085 0.0015 0.0071 
 [0.0028] [0.0033] [0.0017] [0.0090] [0.0094] [0.0048] 
Weak Network 
      
High Individual  -0.0185*** 0.0125*** 0.0060*** 0.0092* -0.0194*** 0.0102*** 
 [0.0015] [0.0018] [0.0012] [0.0049] [0.0053] [0.0025] 
High 
Community  
-0.0024 -0.003 0.0054*** -0.0084 -0.0003 0.0087*** 
 [0.0037] [0.0049] [0.0014] [0.0060] [0.0071] [0.0031] 
Strong 
Network       
High Individual 0.0877*** -0.0766*** -0.0111*** 0.0959*** -0.0840*** -0.0119*** 
 [0.0057] [0.0052] [0.0011] [0.0059] [0.0056] [0.0013] 
High 
Community  
-0.0085 0.0053 0.0032 -0.0272*** 0.0116 0.0156*** 
 [0.0052] [0.0047] [0.0026] [0.0079] [0.0096] [0.0042] 
Observations 
N=15,050,000   N=1,909,000   
*Each measure of social capital is from a separate regression. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level. Each model 
contains the same controls detailed in Table III but are not repeated here for brevity.  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table VIII: Gender and Social Capital 
 Females Males 
Variables Not Working Paid Employment Self-Employment Not Working Paid Employment Self-
Employment 
Trust  
      
High 
Individual  
0.0251*** -0.0251*** -0.0001 -0.0042 0.0078** -0.0036*** 
 [0.0037] [0.0037] [0.0006] [0.0032] [0.0031] [0.0011] 
High 
Community  
-0.0289*** 0.0258*** 0.003 -0.0024 0.0011 0.0013 
 [0.0063] [0.0070] [0.0023] [0.0047] [0.0064] [0.0035] 
Weak 
Network       
High 
Individual  
-0.0012 -0.0034 0.0046*** -0.0269*** 0.0180*** 0.0089*** 
 [0.0027] [0.0023] [0.0010] [0.0017] [0.0021] [0.0015] 
High 
Community  
-0.0093** 0.0033 0.0060*** 0.0003 -0.0049 0.0046*** 
 [0.0041] [0.0047] [0.0012] [0.0053] [0.0066] [0.0017] 
Strong 
Network       
High 
Individual  
0.1166*** -0.1069*** -0.0098*** 0.0464*** -0.0353*** -0.0111*** 
 [0.0076] [0.0071] [0.0010] [0.0028] [0.0032] [0.0011] 
High 
Community  
-0.0383*** 0.0293*** 0.0090*** -0.0039 -0.0052 0.0092** 
 [0.0089] [0.0100] [0.0025] [0.0056] [0.0064] [0.0041] 
Observations 
N=10,260,000   N=10,290,000   
*Each measure of social capital is from a separate regression. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level. Each model 
contains the same controls detailed in Table III but are not repeated here for brevity.  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table IX: Education and Social Capital 
 College Graduate Non-College Graduate 
Variables Not Working Paid Employment Self-Employment Not Working Paid Employment Self-
Employment 
Trust        
High Individual 0.0032 0.0008 -0.0041** 0.0176*** -0.0148*** -0.0028** 
 [0.0032] [0.0027] [0.0018] [0.0037] [0.0035] [0.0011] 
High Community -0.0064* 0.0073 -0.0009 -0.0181*** 0.0152** 0.0028 
 [0.0037] [0.0062] [0.0038] [0.0053] [0.0060] [0.0025] 
Weak Network 
   
   
High Individual  
 
-0.0257*** 0.0156*** 0.0101*** -0.0093*** 0.0067*** 0.0026*** 
 [0.0020] [0.0018] [0.0012] [0.0021] [0.0022] [0.0009] 
High Community  
 
0.0030** -0.0104*** 0.0075** -0.0062 0.0018 0.0043*** 
 [0.0014] [0.0040] [0.0035] [0.0050] [0.0055] [0.0008] 
Strong Network 
    
   
High Individual  0.1017*** -0.0884*** -0.0133*** 0.0865*** -0.0753*** -0.0113*** 
 [0.0083] [0.0068] [0.0023] [0.0040] [0.0042] [0.0007] 
High Community  -0.0208*** 0.0134* 0.0075* -0.0216*** 0.0127 0.0089*** 
 [0.0053] [0.0079] [0.0043] [0.0075] [0.0078] [0.0029] 
Observations 
N=4,963,000   N=15,600,000   
*Each measure of social capital is from a separate regression. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level. Each model 
contains the same controls detailed in Table III but are not repeated here for brevity.  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter II: Amenities and the College-Educated: A Gentrification Perspective!
I. Introduction 
 Gentrification is an important topic within public policy, being a subject of debate and 
interest for economists, city planners, and politicians. Its potential for displacement of incumbent 
residents has led many to label this urban phenomenon as a problem. While there is no set 
definition of gentrification, it is considered a process by which highly educated, wealthier 
individuals locate in previously low-income, high-minority neighborhoods in urban areas. 
Neighborhoods experiencing significant increases in educational attainment or income are 
considered gentrifying in post 2000 metropolitans. Often with gentrification, neighborhoods gain 
access to establishments that were previously lacking, namely consumption amenities such as 
bars, restaurants, and boutiques. In general, cities want to increase the number of highly educated 
individuals as increases in college-educated adults is associated with increased wages of lower-
skilled workers as well as promoting economic growth (Moretti 2004; Pink-Harper 
2015).Therefore, gentrification may not be a problem but a policy tool that city governments 
actively pursue. Gentrification and the mechanisms through which it is perpetrated need to be 
understood in order to formulate appropriate policies. One of these potential mechanisms is the 
establishment location of consumption amenities.     
 The purpose of this paper is the development of a model of the gentrification process 
whereby gentrification and amenity establishment locational choice influence each other.  I 
utilize three-sample three-stage least squares to address the colocation of gentrification, defined 
as growth in a location’s college-educated population and consumption amenities. At its essence, 
the relationship between the two describes their tendency to co-exist in the same location. In this 
way, the model is almost a supply and demand model for space.  
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Currently, there are two main theories on the causal mechanisms of the gentrification 
process: (1) gentrification results from highly educated residents being attracted by growth in 
urban high paying jobs (Edlund, Machado, and Sviatschi 2019) or  (2)  gentrification is caused 
by preferences for urban consumption amenities (Couture and Handbury, 2019). I focus on the 
second mechanism, where gentrification and increasing consumption amenities are modeled as 
happening concurrently – thereby influencing each other. This conceptual model is theoretically 
similar to a “supply and demand” model: the market is for consumption amenities, firms are the 
suppliers, and the highly skilled are the demanders.   
 It is important to understand that there is a discourse between the historical definitions of 
gentrification and the operational definitions employed by researchers. Historically, 
gentrification is the process by which low-income minorities are displaced from their 
neighborhoods by wealthy, highly educated, predominantly white new residents. Displacement is 
thought to potentially occur because property values increase with an influx of more affluent 
families. Incumbent renters and homeowners will see their cost rise (through increases in rents 
and property taxes) and be forced to move. Many studies from the past 20 years, however, find 
that displacement is not extensively occurring in neighborhoods as they undergo the process of 
gentrification (Ding and Hwang, 2016; Martin and Beck, 2018; McKinnish et al., 2010; Vigdor 
et al., 2002).  Operationally, gentrification is typically defined as increases in a neighborhood’s 
place in the distribution of income, the share of college graduates, or housing value (Kolko, 
2007; Lester and Hartley, 2014; Meltzer and Ghorbani, 2017). This paper will make use of this 
operational definition of gentrification while not addressing issues of displacement. 
Neighborhoods are considered gentrified if the neighborhood experiences an increase in the 
share of college-educated adults  over a relatively short period of time since the start of the 2000s 
 
42 
 
(Brummet and Reed, 2019). I utilize both binary and continuous measures of gentrification. 
Gentrification is constructed with an underlying measurement of education attainment to 
emphasize who are the people behind gentrification as opposed to a symptom of gentrification 
(higher income and higher home prices). Consumption amenities are narrowly defined used six-
digit NAICS codes.12  
 This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, the main contribution of this 
paper is to model gentrification in an environment with reverse causality with consumption 
amenities.  Previous literature (e.g., Couture and Handbury, 2019 and Baum-Snow and Hartley 
2020) serve as the precursor to my study by showing there are strong correlations between 
gentrification and consumption amenities. Empirically estimating the causal mechanism of 
gentrification and amenity establishments allows one to have a more complete understanding of 
the process of gentrification. Secondly, in contrast to other studies that typically focus on 
gentrification taking place in poor neighborhoods, I focus my analyses not only on 
neighborhoods that are extremely poor or have low educational attainment, but also consider 
more middle-income/middle-educated neighborhoods.  Studying gentrification in the Chicago 
area, Hwang and Sampson (2014) find that neighborhoods at the lower levels of the income 
distribution stay consistently poor and the incomes in the upper levels of the income distribution 
are consistently rich. The neighborhoods in the middle of the income distribution can go either 
direction. A restricted measure of gentrification that only looks at the poorest neighborhoods (or 
ones with the lowest levels of human capital) during the initial period would leave these middle 
distribution neighborhoods out of the analysis. 
                                                
12 See Appendix B for more details.  
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Finally, this paper adds to the current understanding of the potential positive benefits of 
neighborhood gentrification. The production of consumption amenities (e.g., the workers of 
consumption amenities) often require low skill.  Therefore, gentrification may lead to more job 
opportunities for incumbent low-skill residents. If policymakers are truly concerned about 
displacement, then incentivizing these firms to hire local workers with low educational 
attainment could serve as an important policy objective. 
The rest of this paper is as follows: Section II synthesizes in more detail the literature 
concerning gentrification over the past several decades; Section III describes the data that is 
utilized in this paper; Section IV describes the empirical methodology; Section V presents 
results, and finally Section VI concludes. 
II. Literature Review 
      Early gentrification literature focuses primarily on the years between 1970 and 2000 
(Henig 1980; Vigdor, Massey, and Rivlin 2002) . Because of the influx of wealthy residents, 
gentrification has been characterized in the media by its displacement effects of poor, incumbent 
residents. These effects usually emerge through changes in housing prices. While wealth 
transfers to homeowners in gentrifying neighborhoods seems like a positive effect, it can also be 
harmful to incumbent residents. Neighborhoods and communities that don’t have protections on 
property tax increases may see their incumbent residents forced out. Additionally, high home 
values translate to higher rents, and large increases in rents can hurt incumbent renters.  
 Studies conducted on data from the 1990s find mobility rates of poor residents in 
gentrifying neighborhoods not differing drastically from mobility rates of the same type of 
residents in non-gentrifying neighborhoods (McKinnish, Walsh, and White 2010; Vigdor, 
Massey, and Rivlin 2002). Post-2000 gentrification work has not found much evidence of 
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residential displacement (Ding et al., 2016; Martin and Beck, 2018). All the works mentioned in 
this section use an operational definition of gentrification (i.e., the neighborhoods economic 
standing increased over a time period). While gentrification is often thought of synonymously 
with displacement, the empirical literature presented here finds few associations with 
operationally defined gentrification and displacement.  
 While often viewed negatively because of presumed displacement effects, gentrification 
could lead to beneficial results for incumbent residents. One of the positive aspects of 
gentrification could be the potential for increased employment opportunities for incumbents, as 
gentrification is often associated with an influx of new wealthy households and business into 
previously poor neighborhoods with high unemployment. This is particularly important if the 
residents are experiencing spatial mismatch.  Many of the cities analyzed in the gentrification 
literature have at some point experienced spatial mismatch of their central city’s African-
American population (Hellerstein, Neumark, and McInerney 2008; Holzer 1991; Kain 1968). In 
contrast to the lack of displacement effects in earlier work, there is some evidence that 
gentrification augments spatial mismatch, with neighborhoods experiencing gentrification seeing 
local resident job losses, and therefore, worsening spatial mismatch (Meltzer and Ghorbani, 
2017). While there are more jobs in gentrifying neighborhoods, these jobs are not going to local 
residents. The aforementioned piece, however, was for only one MSA, New York. However, this 
potential negative implication is polarized by evidence of gentrifying neighborhoods benefitting 
incumbents financially in the form of better credit scores and lower default rates (Hartley 2013). 
Empirically, Ding and Hwang (2016) find that gentrification is associated with increases in 
vulnerable populations’ credit scores among residents who remain in gentrifying neighborhoods. 
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These studies suggest the potential for better economic opportunities of incumbent residents, 
perhaps in the form of jobs.  
 While earlier works concerning gentrification examine whether incumbent residents are 
harmed by the influx of new rich inhabitants, there is also a shifting focus to identifying the 
drivers behind recent gentrification. Baum-Snow and Hartley (2020) and Couture and Handbury 
(2019) provide comprehensive evidence of neighborhood changes in almost all major U.S. cities. 
The latter finds that initial levels of consumption amenities have more power to explain 
urbanization than changes in the relative availability of jobs. Additionally, increasing taste for 
non-tradables is the biggest contributing factor towards the increase in the young college 
educated shares of downtown Census Tracts. One of the most important factors for young, 
college-educated city dwellers is the quality of the amenities.  
 Similarly, Baum-Snow and Hartley (2020) find that changes in amenity valuation after 
2000 encourage college-educated whites to move to central city neighborhoods. Less educated 
whites appear to remain in central cities, but less educated minorities are displaced from central 
city neighborhoods. The authors’ results support previous findings that urban revitalization is 
primarily found very close to the central business district, usually within 2-3 kilometers. 
However, none of these studies examine how gentrification has effect changes in amenities.  
Conceptually modeling gentrification and amenities simultaneously shows how the process of 
gentrification can be characterized by both a growth in college-educated residents and growth in 
consumption amenities.  
 From a business perspective, firms are attracted to gentrifying areas. For instance, Lester 
and Hartley (2014) find that gentrification is associated with a mildly positive impact on the 
overall number of jobs. The big take away from their results lies in the type of jobs that are 
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coming to gentrifying neighborhoods. In neighborhoods undergoing revitalization, restaurants 
and retail jobs tend to replace manufacturing jobs. Similarly, Baum-Snow and Hartley (2020) 
find that new businesses are not likely to be displaced by gentrification with “[g]entrifying 
neighborhoods  more likely to attract new types of services than non-gentrifying.”  
 Glaeser et al. (2018) use Yelp data to quantify neighborhood change typically associated 
with gentrification. Operationalized gentrification as measured by changes in the college-
educated has some of the highest correlations with types of establishments that could proxy 
“amenities” such as grocery stores, cafes, and bars. This also calls to attention how businesses, 
not consumers, can contribute to gentrification. Recent findings by Su (2018) suggest that while 
the change in value of time is an initial force behind gentrification, its effects are substantially 
magnified by endogenous amenity improvement. He calls for, “future research [speaking] to how 
firms’ location decision responds to workers geographic sorting” -- this is the focus of this paper. 
 Outside of academics, the potential benefits of gentrification are starting to gain traction. 
Popular press articles, such as a recent article published in The Economist, have now started to 
call attention to the idea that gentrification is many more things than just displacement. While 
gentrification is often looked at with disdain, there are potential benefits when an area undergoes 
gentrification such as access to more amenities, as well as more racial and economic 
integration.13  
III. Data 
 This paper utilizes both publicly available data to measure gentrification and private data 
to provide detailed information on consumption amenity establishments. Data pertaining to 
                                                
13The Economist (2018); Link to source https://www.economist.com/united-
states/2018/06/21/in-praise-of-gentrification.  
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gentrification is obtained via National Historical Geographic Information Systems via 
IPUMS.org (Manson et al. 2019).14 These data contain educational attainment of individuals 
between 25-44 as well as neighborhood median income, where neighborhood is defined as a 
Census Tract. I utilize tables from the 2000 U.S. Decennial Census, the 2005-2009 5-Year 
American Community Survey (ACS) and the 2012-2016 5-Year ACS. With these three data 
sources I have snap shots of the neighborhoods for 3 non-overlapping years. For the two 5-Year 
average tables, I associate the midpoint, 2007 and 2014, as the years with which I match these 
data to the annual establishment level data. Both the 2000 U.S. Decennial Census and the 2005-
2009 5YR ACS are tabulated to 2000 Census Tract geographies. In order for these to be 
comparable to the 2012-2016 5Yr ACS, all data from the two samples are cross walked to 2010 
Census tract geographies using a crosswalk table from U.S. Census Bureau (2020). 
 Establishment level data comes from ReferenceUSA database.15 This is a proprietary 
database that is accessible via the Georgia State University library for the years 1997-2017. Each 
establishment has a six-digit industry code. These detailed codes are called North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS). Outside of restricted data centers, it is rare to find 
establishment level data with this detailed industry codes with fine geographic information. 
Publicly available establishment data, such as the Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB), does 
contained detailed industry information for establishments across the U.S., but the narrowest 
geography available is state-level.16  For this reason, Reference USA data is preferred to other 
                                                
14 Manson, S., Schroeder, J., Van Riper, D., & Ruggles, S. (2019); For more information please 
see: https://nhgis.org/ 
15  ReferenceUSA, 2020; For more information on this database please follow the link: 
http://www.referenceusa.com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/Home/Home 
16 U.S. Census Bureau (2020); For more information on the SUSB, please follow the link: 
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/susb.html 
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data sources. Additionally, this data contains additional information on establishment age as well 
as sales volume. For this paper, only the years 2000, 2007, and 2014 are used as they best match 
the publicly available data used. Detailed industry codes are needed in order to classify an 
industry as a consumption amenity as well as to attempt to proxy for amenity quality. For 
example, a high-end grocery store, such as a Whole Foods [NAICS 445110], has a separate firm 
identifier than a Seven-Eleven [NAICS 445120].17 In publicly available data, only broad industry 
codes are listed, and these two types of establishments are of the same broad industry 
classification [4451]. These data are at the establishment level but are coded to 2010 Census 
Tracts. Individual establishment level data is collapsed to the Census Tract level to obtain 
Census Tract counts of establishments in each 6-digit industry-type. Table B-I in the appendix 
lists the industry codes used to classify establishments as consumption amenities. This 
classification is motivated by establishments and firms found to be prominent in gentrifying 
areas as detailed in Couture and Handbury (2019) and  Glaeser et al. (2018). 
 Census Tract share of college graduates is used to operationalize my gentrification 
measure. The focus on college graduates, as opposed to median income or median housing value, 
allows us to focus on who the gentrifiers are as opposed to how the gentrifiers influence the 
neighborhood change. More so, it is the highly educated who have been found to be most 
associated with increased presence of consumption amenities.  This work examines a spectrum 
of gentrification measures both continuous and discrete.  
 Finally, I restrict all analyses to neighborhoods in metros with populations over 
1,000,000 in 2000. This restriction keeps my samples similar to the samples used in the existing 
                                                
17 NAICS Association (2018); For more information on NAICS please follow the link: 
https://www.naics.com/search/ 
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gentrification literature (Couture and Handbury, 2019; Glaeser et al., 2018; Meltzer and 
Ghorbani, 2017). A list of these metros is available in Table X. Approximately 27,000 Census 
tracts are included in my sample of these 50 metros. This constitutes slightly over a third of 
Census tracts in the 2010 delineations (U.S. Census Bureau, 2020).  
IV. Methodology 
 This section will describe the methodology used to define gentrification and amenities as 
well as how the two will be modelled together. The time span of my study is between 2007 and 
2014.  
 IV.A. Gentrification 
 Gentrifiers are typically young, educated, and wealthy adults (Baum-Snow & Hartley, 
2020; Couture & Handbury, 2019; Meltzer & Ghorbani, 2017; Su, 2018). Following Brummet 
and Reed  (2019), gentrification in this paper is measured by the share of college graduates in a 
neighborhood. This measure is consistent with the idea that urban revival (another phrase used to 
describe gentrification) is driven by this group across racial categories, except for college 
educated Blacks where the growth in this demographic is still concentrated in  suburbs (Couture 
and Handbury 2019).  I construct several measures of gentrification, both dichotomous and 
continuous, in order to compare my results with the previous literature’s findings. The first 
measure of gentrification is an indicator for whether a neighborhood has gentrified. A 
neighborhood is considered gentrified if the share of college graduates (SCG) in census tract t in 
Core-based Statistical Area (CBSA) c was in the bottom three quintiles of the CBSA’s 
distribution of share of college graduates in 2007 and in the top two quintiles (or top quintile) of 
the CBSA’s distribution of share of college graduates in 2014. This restriction is done to create a 
group of neighborhoods that have a common set of circumstances (low-to-moderate-education) 
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during an initial time period and therefore, have the ability to move most upwards in the 
distribution. However, one drawback is that it does treat small movers and big movers within the 
CBSA distribution the same. This indicator measure of gentrification is described in equation (1) 
below.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 
"#$%&'('#) = 1!'(!!,-".,0,1223 ≤ ,-".,0,1223
5267
!89:!,-".,0,12;< ≥ ,-".,0,12;<
5267
"#$%&'('#) = 0!?%ℎ#&A'B#!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!!!!!!!!(1) 
I compare this measure of gentrification with a neighborhood’s (census tract i) change in college 
graduates, ages 25-44, between 2007 and 2014 in Core-Based Statistical Area E relative to the 
total number of 25-44-year old’s in 2007. This very similar to the measure utilized in Brummet 
and Reed (2019) . It captures the change in college graduates, ages 25-44, relative to the initial 
population, ages 25-44, in CBSA E in Census Tract '. The change in college graduates is 
weighted by the initial population as to not simultaneously correlate a change in college 
graduates during this time period with people of less educational attainment moving away and 
people with more educational attainment moving in. 
∆-"0,. =
-".,0,12;< − -".,0,1223!!!
H?%IJ!K?LMJI%'?$1NO<<!.,0,1223
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(2) 
 
I utilize the measure from (2) on the sample of neighborhoods considered by the dichotomous 
measure described in equation (1) as well as in a specification where there is no restriction on 
initial neighborhood conditions (i.e., the share of college graduates).  Equation (2) is more 
flexible than the dichotomous definition of gentrification since it does not arbitrarily assign a 
label of "gentrified" to any neighborhood, but simply compares the growth in a key characteristic 
used to identify the process of gentrification. 
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 IV.B. Amenities 
 From the ReferenceUSA data, establishments are mapped to Census tracts. 
Establishments are considered an amenity or not based on their six-digit NAICS code. Utilizing 
detailed industry codes allows me to proxy for amenity quality. I measure growth in amenities as 
the change in amenity establishments (AE) in CBSA E in Census Tract ', between 2007 and 
2014, relative to the number of total establishments in CBSA E in Census Tract ', in 2007. The 
explicit measure of amenities utilized in the empirical model is detailed below:  
∆QR.,0 =
QR.,0,12;< − QR.,0,1223!!!
H?%IJ!RB%ISJ'BℎT#$%B.,0,1223
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(3) 
 The change in amenity establishments is also weighted by 2007 level establishments for a 
similar reason why the change in college graduates is weighted by its 2007 level of college 
graduates: to not systematically correlate the measurement with establishments moving out and 
being replaced by other establishments moving into the neighborhood.  
      IV.C.  Simultaneous Determination of Gentrification and Amenities 
      The empirical contribution of this paper is estimating the causal relationship between 
amenities and gentrification using three-stage least squares (3SLS) methodology. This method 
was pioneered by Zellner and Theil (1962) and “[uses] the two-stage least squares estimated 
moment matrix of the structural disturbances to estimate all coefficients of the entire system 
simultaneously.”  3SLS allows for the error terms across equations to be correlated. Therefore, 
previous work such as Baum-Snow and Hartley (2020) and  Couture and Handbury, (2019) fail 
to account for this cross correlation in explaining the relationship between consumption 
amenities and gentrification, operationalized by changes in a neighborhood’s educational 
attainment. Accounting for this cross correlation of the system errors terms is the main advantage 
of the 3SLS methodology over traditional two stage least squares.  
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The estimating equations are defined as follows:  
"#$%0,. = 1 = V + X;%∆QR0,. + X1,-"0,.Z[[[ + \0,. + ]0 + ^0,.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(4) 
∆QR0,. = ` + a; "#$%0,. = 1 + a1!,RQ0,.Z[[[ + b0,. + c0 + d0,.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(5) 
Equations (4) and (5) are estimated via three-stage least squares (3SLS). The final stage of the 
estimating procedure is done via generalized least squares (GLS).18 Therefore, the results from 
estimating equations (4) and (5) should be assumed as coming from GLS.  In equations (4) and 
(5) ]0 and c0 are CBSA fixed effects.  \0,.  are Census Tract percentage change in the number of 
renters and the percentage change in unemployment from 2007 to 2014. b0,. are Census Tract 
percentage change in unemployment from 2007 and 2014 and median establishment age.19 
,-"0,.Z[[[ denotes the neighborhood’s initial share of college graduates in 2000. ,RQ0,.Z[[[ 
denotes the neighborhood’s initial share of amenity establishments in 2000.   
 In each of the equations an exogenous regressor identifies the equations.  All exogenous 
regressors act as instrument for both the endogenous variables in the system in the first stage.20 
The estimation of this system is different than pure instrumental variables. In an instrumental 
variable system, one would directly use an instrument f for the endogenous variables. Here the 
exogenous variables are part of the set of simultaneous equations. Typical for instruments, the 
exclusion restriction requires that each exogenous variable only influences the model through the 
endogenous variable. For gentrification, initial shares of college graduates (in 2000) will 
determine how the share of college graduates over 2007 and 2014 change but shouldn’t influence 
                                                
18 ∆-" is replaces "#$% = 1 when the gentrification measurement is a continuous one.  
19 Median establishment age is included in the amenity equation due the relationship between 
firm growth and age of existing establishment age found in Faberman (2011) 
20 I utilize the reg3 command in Stata to estimate the system of equations detailed in (4) and (5). 
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the current percent change in amenities. Previous work has found that urban revival pre-2000, 
was more focused on individuals desire to live closer to work and more recent urban revival is 
due in part to individuals’ desire to locate near consumption amenities (Couture and Handbury, 
2019). Its effect in the system is measures by X1!in equation (4). A similar argument is used for 
the initial (2000) share of amenities and current gentrification of a census tract. It’s influence in 
the system of equations is measured by a1 in equation (5).   In all analyses, census tracts are 
weighted by their 2000-level population.  
 Table X displays means of ∆-" and ∆QR for the sample that is restricted to only 
neighborhoods whose 2007 share of college graduates was in the bottom 60th percentile of the 
CBSA distribution and the correlation between the two. There are approximately 16,000 
neighborhoods in this sample.  Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL has the strongest correlation 
between gentrification and consumption amenities at 0.2684.  
V. Results 
 I first briefly discuss results from the first stage in the 3SLS setup. Then the final stage 
estimates compare the dichotomous measure of gentrification (equation 2) to the continuous 
measure of gentrification described in equation (3), for the full sample and then for the restricted 
sample. 
      V.A. First Stage Results  
 Table B-II and B-III present the results for the first stage of the 3SLS. Table B-II are the 
first stage results from the specification where the sample of neighborhoods is restricted to only 
neighborhoods in the bottom 60% percentile of the CBSA distribution of college graduate shares 
in 2007. The gentrification measures are described by equations (1) and (2). Table B-III does not 
restrict the sample and the measure of gentrification is measured first as the %∆,- detailed in 
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equation (2) and then as an indicator if a neighborhood’s %∆," is in the top 40% of the CBSA 
distribution of %∆-".   
 In 3SLS, all exogenous regressors enter the first stage. For each equation in the system, a 
good identification strategy needs variables that identify the system. For the gentrification 
equation (7), the unique regressors are 2000 share of college graduates ages 25-44 and the 
percentage change in renters. For the amenity equation, the median establishment age and the 
2000 share of amenities are the identifying regressors.  
 Table B-II restricts the neighborhoods to the set of neighborhoods with college education 
shares in the bottom 60% of the CBSA distribution of college-educated shares. The 2000 shares 
of college graduates strongly predict both the propensity for a neighborhood to gentrify and 
increases in %∆QR. Table B-III does not restrict the neighborhoods by their 2007 share of 
college graduates. The binary gentrification measure detailed in equation (2) is 1 if the ∆-" is in 
the top 40% of the CBSA distribution of ∆-". Overall, in both equations, the exogenous 
identifiers are statistically significant in predicting the endogenous regressors.  
 V.B. 3SLS: Initial Condition Restrictions Gentrification 
 As was mentioned earlier, 3SLS not only deals with the endogeneity between 
gentrification and consumption amenities but allows for there to be cross correlation in the 
disturbance terms of the system of equations (^0,. and  d0,. in equations  (4) and (5)). I first look 
at the simultaneous relationship between gentrification and amenity establishments by examining 
neighborhoods who share of college graduates was in the lower 60th percentile of its CBSA 
distribution. This sample selection is similar to sample selection in previous gentrification 
literature (Martin and Beck, 2018; McKinnish et al., 2010; Meltzer and Ghorbani, 2017). In 
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contrast to previous works, I make this restriction in order to capture not simply potentially poor 
neighborhoods but also more middle-income neighborhoods as well.21  
 Table XI presents the results from three specifications on this restricted sample. The first 
specification is detailed in columns (1) and (2). Here gentrification is a dichotomous measure 
equal to 1 if the neighborhood moves up in its CBSA distribution of share of college graduates to 
the top 40th percentile in 2014. When controlling for the potential simultaneity between both 
endogenous variables, I fail to find conclusive evidence that increases in amenities measured by 
growth in establishments relative to total establishments in 2007 increase the likelihood a 
neighborhood gentrifies significantly in 2014. Columns (3) and (4) are results from a more 
“restrictive” gentrification measure, where a neighborhood is labelled as gentrified if the 
neighborhood moves to the upper 20th percentile in the 2014 CBSA distribution of share of 
college graduates. In both dichotomous gentrification specifications, neighborhoods that gentrify 
see increases in the number of amenities, as measured by number of establishments, with 
neighborhoods whose increase in their share of college graduates seeing increases by 0.01592 
percentage points (1.592/100). Compared to the mean increase in %∆QR of gentrifying 
neighborhoods of 0.36, gentrification leads to approximately 4% increase in %∆QR. Columns (5) 
and (6) utilize the continuous gentrification measure described in equation (2) but still on the 
initial condition restricted sample. Compared to the dichotomous system, where big movers and 
small movers within the CBSA distribution are treated the same, here the actual growth or 
change in the share of college graduates is modelled directly in the system. The results are 
                                                
21 I use the term “middle-income”, but I still only use measures of educational attainment to 
make gentrification determinants. 
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consistent with the previous two specification albeit with a slightly poorer fit in the amenity 
establishment equation.  
 V.C. 3SLS: No Initial Condition Restrictions Gentrification 
 I next examine the simultaneous nature between gentrification and amenity 
establishments utilizing my entire sample of neighborhoods. Unlike the specification detailed in 
Table II, the specifications detailed in Table XII put no restrictions on a neighborhood’s 
eligibility to gentrify. Therefore, middle- and high-income neighborhoods are included. The 
underlying measure of gentrification is that of equation (2).22 A neighborhood simply gentrifies 
if it’s ∆-" is in the upper 40th (or 20th) of the CBSA distribution of ∆-". Therefore, the binary 
indicator of gentrification as seen in Table XII, is based off a neighborhood’s place in the ∆-" 
distribution. These specifications are detailed in columns (1)-(4) in Table XII. Neighborhoods 
that see growth in their college graduates see increases in their amenities (0.002 and 0.005). 
There is again no conclusive evidence that increases in amenities is driving gentrification.  
Finally, columns (5) and (6), simply let the ∆-" enter as the measure of gentrification. While the 
results here are consistent with all previous specifications, the fit is exceedingly poor (a negative 
adjusted g1). These results indicate the importance in the gentrification literature of identifying 
the correct counterfactuals. In other words, the initial conditions a neighborhood (here 
                                                
22 Specifications run with gentrification specified by equations (1) and (2) were a poor fit.  
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neighborhoods with initially low shares of college graduates), are the neighborhoods to consider 
when studying gentrification as operationalized here.  
 V.D. Falsification-Always High-Education Neighborhoods vs. Always Low-Education 
Neighborhoods 
      The final specifications I estimate are akin to “falsification” specifications. I first estimate 
a model where I only consider tracts in the top 40th percentile of the CBSA distribution of share 
of college graduates. Then, I indicate a neighborhood as gentrified if that neighborhood remains 
in the top 40th percentile. I estimate this system to test the hypothesis that the neighborhoods that 
are important in the discussion of gentrification and amenities are ones that initially start out 
lower in the CBSA educational attainment distribution. The results from this specification are 
detailed in Table XIII columns (1) and (2). Here, there is some evidence that growth in amenities 
increases the likelihood a neighborhood remains in the top 40th percentile. However, 
neighborhoods that remain in the top 40th percentile (i.e., gentrified), don’t offer any evidence of 
increases the number of amenity establishments.  
 I next look at only neighborhoods whose share of college graduates was in the bottom 
40th percentile of the CBSA distribution in 2007 and indicate “gentrification” if a neighborhood 
stays there.  This is a falsification test because, these neighborhoods always remain educationally 
poor and therefore do not meet the criterion for gentrification.  Neighborhoods that meet this 
requirement see a decrease in the ∆QR and increases in ∆QR do not indicate any evidence that a 
neighborhood remains in the lower part of the share of college education distribution. These two 
specifications shed some light that in terms of growth in amenities, neighborhoods that see 
increases in college graduates from initially low levels to much higher levels are the 
neighborhoods that are see the largest increases in the amenities in their neighborhood.  
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VI. Concluding Remarks 
 Gentrification is a popular topic of conversation in many cities in the U.S. The attraction 
of educated adults can have positive spillover affects to less educated adults in the form of  
higher wages (Moretti 2004). To my knowledge, this paper is the first to put a simultaneous 
framework on the relationship between gentrification and consumption by modelling the two 
entities using simultaneous empirical strategy. This is the main contribution of the paper.  
 I find when controlling for the simultaneous nature between the two entities, 
gentrification causes a neighborhood to see a growth in its amenities, measured here by amenity 
establishments. However, there is no conclusive evidence that gentrification is leading to a 
neighborhood’s growth in amenities (as measured by changes in amenity producing 
establishments). This is in direct contrast to previous literature such as Couture and Handbury 
(2019). This may be due in part to the failure to model the simultaneous decision of both 
establishments and individuals co-locating, which the simultaneous model considers.  
 One key takeaway from this work is that gentrification is not solely about displacement. 
Many things are occurring when a neighborhood is undergoing gentrification. The results in this 
paper speak to the potential benefits from gentrification. Gentrification is found to increase 
neighborhood amenities. Individuals in neighborhoods with higher amenities have residents that 
report higher levels of happiness than individuals in low amenity and rural areas (Cox and 
Streeter, 2019). While the economic costs of displacement are no concern to be ignored, it is 
important to consider other phenomena that are occurring and how that phenomenon affect 
individuals.   
 One drawback of the current analyses is the limited panel nature. Establishment level data 
with such detailed industry codes is difficult to acquire outside of purchasing the data (i.e., the 
National Establishment of Times Series) or obtaining it through a government lab (i.e., a Federal 
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Research Data Center). Future work will expand the current model with more updated data 
utilizing the Census Bureau’s Business Registrar.  
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Table X: Chapter II Summary Statistics 
CBSA 
Total  
Tracts 
Eligible  
to Gentrify* 
Restricted  
Sample  
# 
Gentrified 
Mean 
 %∆#$%,'** 
Mean 
%∆()%,'** 
Correlations 
between 
Gentrification 
and Amenities 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-
Marietta, GA 456 287 26 0.153 0.4589 0.0259 
Austin-Round Rock-San 
Marcos, TX 198 122 17 0.2562 0.346 -0.024 
Baltimore-Towson, MD 477 356 32 0.2557 0.2518 0.0284 
Birmingham-Hoover, AL 177 130 7 0.1064 0.4908 0.0501 
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, 
MA-NH 786 486 33 0.2121 0.2433 0.001 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 244 149 21 0.5874 0.3904 0.1912 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, 
NC-SC 143 102 10 0.4781 0.4175 0.1471 
Chicago-Joliet-Naperville, IL-
IN-WI 1,441 924 64 0.2369 0.2196 0.0226 
Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-
KY-IN 400 255 33 0.2561 0.3932 0.0445 
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 550 344 33 0.2121 0.2503 0.085 
Columbus, OH 326 218 15 0.1896 0.2085 0.0287 
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CBSA 
Total  
Tracts 
Eligible  
to Gentrify* 
Restricted  
Sample  
# 
Gentrified 
Mean 
 %∆#$%,'** 
Mean 
%∆()%,'** 
Correlations 
between 
Gentrification 
and Amenities 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, 
TX 831 591 37 0.2275 0.3867 0.0786 
Denver-Aurora-Broomfield, CO 376 236 25 0.3394 0.4734 0.0101 
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI 1,095 719 58 0.1692 0.313 0.1289 
Hartford-West Hartford-East 
Hartford, CT 245 158 23 0.2034 0.1803 -0.0191 
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, 
TX 682 456 32 0.4476 0.175 0.0079 
Indianapolis-Carmel, IN 252 175 16 0.2111 0.1348 0.0539 
Jacksonville, FL 143 113 9 0.1359 0.2918 0.0035 
Kansas City, MO-KS 374 244 19 0.169 0.2897 0.054 
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV 234 193 28 0.1814 0.1596 -0.0482 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa 
Ana, CA 2,117 1,340 94 0.2026 0.2099 0.0634 
Louisville/Jefferson County, 
KY-IN 212 138 12 0.1761 0.276 0.0567 
Memphis, TN-MS-AR 202 129 11 0.1417 0.1184 0.0124 
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CBSA 
Total  
Tracts 
Eligible  
to Gentrify* 
Restricted  
Sample  
# 
Gentrified 
Mean 
 %∆#$%,'** 
Mean 
%∆()%,'** 
Correlations 
between 
Gentrification 
and Amenities 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-
Pompano Beach, FL 570 393 42 0.2126 0.5005 0.0106 
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West 
Allis, WI 326 221 18 0.225 0.0705 0.0675 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-
Bloomington, MN-WI 655 414 41 0.2066 0.4783 0.0784 
Nashville-Davidson--
Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN 173 116 16 0.2558 0.2644 -0.0416 
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, 
LA 282 204 32 0.4644 0.7733 -0.0255 
New York-Northern New 
Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA 3,680 2,376 257 0.2731 0.1841 -0.0062 
Oklahoma City, OK 276 189 20 0.4943 0.4029 0.0644 
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, 
FL 250 141 22 0.168 0.6359 0.2684 
Philadelphia-Camden-
Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD 1,138 726 66 0.24 0.3331 0.0457 
Phoenix-Mesa-Glendale, AZ 420 279 24 0.1987 0.4242 0.001 
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CBSA 
Total  
Tracts 
Eligible  
to Gentrify* 
Restricted  
Sample  
# 
Gentrified 
Mean 
 %∆#$%,'** 
Mean 
%∆()%,'** 
Correlations 
between 
Gentrification 
and Amenities 
Pittsburgh, PA 574 368 51 0.296 0.1636 -0.0648 
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, 
OR-WA 356 215 16 0.2353 0.6339 0.056 
Providence-New Bedford-Fall 
River, RI-MA 324 205 25 0.1789 0.2257 0.0665 
Richmond, VA 214 139 9 0.2568 0.1902 -0.0727 
Riverside-San Bernardino-
Ontario, CA 361 262 25 0.1334 0.4052 0.1114 
Rochester, NY 225 150 14 0.252 0.4336 0.0841 
Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--
Roseville, CA 325 232 19 0.1865 0.0952 -0.0269 
San Antonio-New Braunfels, 
TX 420 273 24 0.1789 0.2214 0.0963 
San Diego-Carlsbad-San 
Marcos, CA 217 164 10 0.6855 0.4716 0.035 
San Francisco-Oakland-
Fremont, CA 527 346 26 0.2438 0.3286 0.0972 
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CBSA 
Total  
Tracts 
Eligible  
to Gentrify* 
Restricted  
Sample  
# 
Gentrified 
Mean 
 %∆#$%,'** 
Mean 
%∆()%,'** 
Correlations 
between 
Gentrification 
and Amenities 
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa 
Clara, CA 709 442 36 0.2805 0.337 -0.0545 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 294 179 20 0.3288 0.2214 -0.0065 
St. Louis, MO-IL 566 343 31 0.2347 0.7702 0.0415 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-
Clearwater, FL 377 239 40 0.2251 0.3381 0.021 
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-
Newport News, VA-NC 275 192 29 0.1814 0.5077 0.1135 
Washington-Arlington-
Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 644 444 44 0.4923 0.4746 0.0103 
*  Denotes summary statistic came from the restrict sample that includes only tracts in the bottom 60% of the CBSA 
distribution of share of college graduates ** Denotes the summary statistics for tracts that gentrified in the restricted sample 
including only tracts in the bottom 60% of the CBSA distribution of share of college graduates 
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Table XI: Restricted Sample-Binary vs. Continuous Gentrification Measure 
 Binary Gentrification  
Top 40% in 2014 
Binary Gentrification  
Top 20% in 2014 
Continuous Measure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Gentrification ∆() Gentrification ∆() Gentrification ∆() 
       
∆()',% -0.0240  -0.00868  6.87e-05  
 [0.0190]  [0.00616]  [0.00837]  
*$#',%,+,,, 1.028***  0.124***  0.146***  
 [0.0219]  [0.00713]  [0.00963]  
%∆-./0.12',%,(+,,4,+,56) -0.00139  0.00170  0.0104***  
 [0.00348]  [0.00112]  [0.00148]  
%∆8/.9:-;0.',%,(+,,4,+,56)  -0.00490** -0.000654 -0.00101 -1.92e-05 -0.00443*** 0.00574 
 [0.00221] [0.00522] [0.000720] [0.00533] [0.000978] [0.00558] 
Gentrification Measure  0.181***  1.592***  1.759*** 
  [0.0487]  [0.413]  [0.318] 
*()',%,+,,,  -0.953***  -0.959***  -0.933*** 
  [0.0422]  [0.0429]  [0.0442] 
Median Firm Age in 
2014 
 -0.00151***  -0.00154***  -
0.00145**
* 
  [0.000311]  [0.000313]  [0.000310] 
Constant -0.102*** 0.686*** -0.0189*** 0.701*** -0.0101 0.657*** 
 [0.0162] [0.0373] [0.00526] [0.0376] [0.00714] [0.0395] 
       
Observations 16,111 16,111 16,111 16,111 16,111 16,111 
Adjusted R-squared 0.134 0.073 0.025 0.034 0.055 -0.009 
Note: All results from the restricted sample of only tracts whose share of college educated was in the bottom 60th percentile in 
2007. Gentrification Measure is either 1 if the neighborhood moved to the top 40th percentile or the top 20th percentile in 2014 
in the Binary measures. In columns (5) and (6), gentrification is simply %∆<=. %∆>? is as detailed in equation (4) *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table XII: Unrestricted Sample: Binary vs. Continuous Gentrification Measures 
 Binary 
Top 40% 
Binary  
Top 20% 
Continuous 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Gentrification ∆() Gentrification ∆() Gentrification ∆() 
       
∆()',% -0.00841  -0.0233  -0.0205  
 [0.00835]  [0.0193]  [0.0248]  
*$#',%,+,,, -0.0428***  0.168***  0.0325***  
 [0.00533]  [0.0123]  [0.0126]  
%∆-./0.12',%,(+,,4,+,56) 0.00714***  0.0132***  0.00887***  
 [0.00103]  [0.00231]  [0.00250]  
%∆8/.9:-;0.',%,(+,,4,+,56) -0.00650*** -0.000119 -0.0105*** 0.00340 -0.0168*** 0.0365** 
 [0.000925] [0.00454] [0.00214] [0.00406] [0.00277] [0.0143] 
Gentrification Measure  0.231  0.564***  2.325*** 
  [0.385]  [0.119]  [0.747] 
*()',%,+,,,  -1.060***  -1.025***  -1.062*** 
  [0.0346]  [0.0357]  [0.0653] 
Median Firm Age in 2014  -0.00142***  -0.00130***  -
0.00132**
* 
  [0.000262]  [0.000264]  [0.000289] 
Constant 0.0165** 0.722*** 0.132*** 0.609*** 0.394*** -0.209 
 [0.00773] [0.0305] [0.0179] [0.0395] [0.0231] [0.304] 
       
Observations 26,139 26,139 26,139 26,139 26,139 26,139 
Adjusted R-squared 0.024 0.067 0.011 -0.020 0.003 -2.651 
Note: All results from the unrestricted sample. Gentrification Measure is either 1 if the neighborhood moved to the top 40th 
percentile or the top 20th percentile in 2014 in the Binary measures. In columns (5) and (6), gentrification is simply %∆<=. 
%∆>? is as detailed in equation (4) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table XIII: Falsification Tests 
 Always Top 40% in CBSA  
∆$# 
Always Bottom 40% in CBSA 
 ∆$# 
 Binary Binary 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Gentrification ∆() Gentrification ∆() 
     
∆()',% 0.0417*  -0.0120  
 [0.0246]  [0.0307]  
*$#',%,+,,, 0.982***  -1.989***  
 [0.0205]  [0.0455]  
%∆-./0.12',%,(+,,4,+,56) -7.81e-05  -0.00554  
 [0.00239]  [0.00743]  
%∆8/.9:-;0.',%,(+,,4,+,56) -0.0103*** -0.00378 0.0103*** 0.00427 
 [0.00259] [0.00549] [0.00368] [0.00689] 
Gentrification Measure  -0.0631  -0.121*** 
  [0.0448]  [0.0415] 
*()',%,+,,,  -1.151***  -0.916*** 
  [0.0598]  [0.0524] 
Median Firm Age in 2014  -0.000577  -0.00125*** 
  [0.000478]  [0.000370] 
Constant 0.299*** 0.771*** 1.146*** 0.760*** 
 [0.0279] [0.0672] [0.0249] [0.0555] 
     
Observations 10,028 10,028 10,972 10,972 
Adjusted R-squared 0.194 0.062 0.166 0.077 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: The gentrified dependent variable is measured as 0/1 and the amenities dependent variable is measure as %∆@>? as 
detailed in equation (4) .*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are denoted in brackets. In columns (1) and (2), only 
neighborhoods whose share of college graduates was in the top 40th percentile in 2007 are considered. In columns (3) and (4), 
only neighborhoods whose share of college graduates was in the bottom 40th percentile in 2007 are considered.
 
68 
 
Chapter III: Revisiting the Burden of the Gas Tax in an Electric Vehicle World 
I. Introduction 
      In January 2019, the United States had the fifth-largest per capita electric vehicle fleet in 
the world, behind Norway, Netherlands, Sweden, and Belgium.23  In the last decade and a half, 
the electrification of private transportation has grown steadily. While the overall percentage of 
electric vehicles sold each year in the private transportation sector is still rather small, 
constituting about 1.15 percent of cars on the road, there have been large year-to-year increases 
over the past decade.24 As depicted in Figure I, the sales of Plug-in Electric Vehicles (PEV) have 
quadrupled since The Transportation Research Center at Argonne National Laboratory started 
counting in 2011. Part of the increase in uptake of electric vehicles may be due to the national 
government and state governments’ tax credits and subsidies for the purchase of a new electric 
vehicle.  For example, the first 200,000 buyers of any PEV model are eligible for a federal tax 
credit of up to $7,500 (IRS, 2020). Assuming, each purchase of a PEV displaces a gas-powered 
vehicle, this growth in PEV purchases necessarily, all else equal, means less consumption of 
gasoline. The primary purpose of this paper is to determine whether this changing consumption 
pattern has resulted in a change in the elasticity of demand for gasoline and its implications for 
tax incidence of the national gasoline tax. 
      The national gas tax for unleaded gasoline is 18.4 cents per gallon sold and has remained 
constant for 27 years. (Shaper 2018). In 2018, approximately 22 billion dollars was collected in 
federal highway tax revenue ( Highway Statistics 2018, Federal Highway Administration). As 
                                                
23 Green Car Reports, (Everts, 2019); For more information please: 
https://www.greencarreports.com/news/1121186_us-has-worlds-second-highest-electric-car-
population 
24 CityLab, (Bellan, 2018); The Grim State of Electric Vehicle Adoption in the U.S. 
:https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2018/10/where-americas-charge-towards-electric-
vehicles-stands-today/572857/ 
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this tax is a flat percentage, the tax is naturally regressive at face value (i.e., poorer households 
who spend the same amount of money on gasoline as a richer household pay a larger share of 
their income in gasoline taxes). Since PEVs are typically purchased by wealthier households, the 
burden of the gasoline tax will increasingly fall on poorer households as PEV sales increase.25 
To estimate the elasticity of demand for gasoline, this paper will estimate a consumer 
demand system taking into consideration private transportation fuel sources, namely the 
consumption of gasoline. To estimate the incidence of increases in the gasoline tax, I estimate 
two scenarios where electric vehicles enter a consumer’s expenditure set.  The empirical 
structure of this paper is based on West and Williams (2004), updating their analysis from 20 
years ago in a private transportation environment that has undergone dramatic change since their 
work.  
      Given this change in purchasing habits of a common commodity, one might consider how 
the entrance of electric vehicles in the private transportation market has affected household’s 
demand elasticity for gasoline and whether the gas tax is becoming increasingly regressive. In 
other words, as more households invest in and purchase electric vehicles, the burden of the gas 
tax (a primary funding source for infrastructure) falls onto the people that purchase gasoline.  
Furthermore, electric vehicles are often purchased by wealthier households, which leaves the 
burden of the national gas tax more so on lower-income households. Therefore, these wealthy 
households will still be using the infrastructure but no longer paying to support its upkeep. From 
                                                
25 Chakraborty et al. (2019) report that 88% of the owners of electric vehicles in California 
survey had incomes higher than the median income for the state. This is unsurprising as PEVs 
often are at least 90% more expensive in purchase price than comparable internal combustive 
engines. KellyBlueBook (2018). See : https://mediaroom.kbb.com/2018-02-01-Average-New-
Car-Prices-Rise-Nearly-4-Percent-For-January-2018-On-Shifting-Sales-Mix-According-To-
Kelley-Blue-Book 
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a social welfare perspective, this leads one to question the tax incidence of gasoline when fewer 
households consume gasoline. To my knowledge, no paper has examined how changes to a 
current policy like the national gas tax affects consumers in an environment where private 
transportation looks drastically different than it did 25 years ago.  
     This paper continues as follows: Section II describes this paper’s place in the relevant 
literature; Section III describes the data; Section IV explains the methodology; Section V details 
the simulations and discuss; Section VI concludes.  
II. Literature Review 
 The gasoline tax is a policy instrument that both supports local and national infrastructure 
as well as internalizes some negative externalities from gasoline consumption. Because taxes 
change the price of gasoline directly and are therefore a market based approach that let 
consumers change their optimal behavior, they are generally preferred to other policy 
instruments such as fuel standards (Davis and Knittel 2016). Also, from a welfare perspective, 
gas taxes are often preferred to fuel standards (Anderson et al. 2011) as they give consumers 
more flexibility in their choice set and typically exceed estimated per-gallon climate damages. 
Since gasoline taxes are levied as a flat rate based on the purchase, they are considered a 
regressive tax. In other words, for the same type of car and same miles driven, a poor household 
would pay more in taxes as a share of their household income than a rich household. Empirically, 
however, the regressivity of gas taxes depends on how the revenue is used (West and Williams 
2004; Bento et al. 2009). If the revenue collected is simply discarded, then the tax is regressive. 
However, if the revenue is recycled via a cut in the labor tax or returned via a lump sum, then the 
regressivity of the tax is less severe and may also be slightly progressive (West and Williams 
2004). 
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 Many analyses with a PEV focus tend to analyze how environmentally “friendly” (or 
unfriendly) electric cars are compared to traditional vehicles. Holland et al. (2016) find that 
overall, tax credit incentives towards the purchase of a PEV are not justified, as PEV are often 
just as “dirty” as gasoline power vehicles. Tscharaktschiew (2015), is the only paper, to my 
knowledge, that considers gasoline taxes in the presence of an emerging electric vehicle market. 
He estimates the efficient gasoline tax in a world with electric vehicles for Germany and finds 
that optimal gasoline taxation may increase or decrease depending on PEV diffusion, electricity 
generation source, and external cost of PEVs. The aforementioned paper does not address the 
question of what the optimal gasoline tax should be, but rather, focuses on the implications of 
changing demand for the regressivity of the tax and the ability of the tax to generate revenue in 
an environment of fewer gasoline powered vehicles. This would be the closest comparison to the 
work I do in this paper. However, I focus not on changing optimal taxation but seeing how the 
optimal gas tax from previous works affects the regressivity of the national gas tax when more 
households are consuming electric vehicles (i.e., decreasing their consumption of gasoline).  
 Finally, the expectation that the gasoline tax has become more regressive as sales of 
PEVs have increased assumes that it is wealthier households making most of those purchases. 
This assumption is supported by work by Chakraborty et al. (2019), who report that 88% of the 
owners of electric vehicles in their California survey had incomes higher than the median income 
for the state. Tal and Nicholas (2016) explore the impact of the federal tax credit towards electric 
vehicles across several states. Most buyers were found to have household incomes of $50,000 or 
higher. Figure 2 details the income distribution from their sample. As discussed in the next 
section, I do not have information on which households purchase electric vehicles. Therefore, I 
 
72 
 
rely on the assumption that, overwhelmingly, wealthier households are the most likely owners of 
PEVs.   
III. Data 
 In order to estimate a demand system, I need information on household expenditures on 
gasoline, wages, and other goods. In order to simulate tax increases and estimate tax incidence, I 
need information on state level gasoline taxes. Therefore, data for this paper comes from several 
publicly available sources and one private source.  
 The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) is a nationally representative survey that 
contains detailed questions on household spending habits, income, hours worked, demographic, 
and geographic information for all individuals in the household. Households are surveyed 
between 1 to 4 times. This survey is used to estimate a detailed consumer demand system. 
Following West and Williams (2004), the sample is restricted to two types of households: 
households with 1 adult and households with 2 adults and their dependent or under 18 year old 
children. I utilize the 2016 through 2018 quarterly interview files. These interview files contain 
household information of expenditures such as gasoline and individual information on wages.   I 
focus on this time period as opposed to earlier years, as the first plug-in hybrid became available 
in 2010 and the costs of electric battery vehicles only started to significantly decrease in 2013.26 
In other words, at least prior to 2013, I wouldn’t expect any major differences in the private 
transportation market that would influence  household’s elasticity of gasoline. As seen in Figure 
I, the choices of PEV models has expanded since 2010, giving households several options of 
PEV by 2016.  
                                                
26 Department of Energey (2020); Timeline: History of the Electric Car: 
https://www.energy.gov/timeline/timeline-history-electric-car 
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The second vital aspect of a consumer demand system is information on prices. I utilize 
the Council for Community and Economic Research Historical Cost of Living Index, which I 
purchased. This data set contains quarterly price information for a bundle of goods going back to 
the first quarter over the time span of my CEX data. Other data used for the analyses include the 
quarterly state unemployment rate and state gasoline tax rates on gasoline, which are obtained 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Federation of Tax Administrators, respectively.27 
Unemployment rate data are important for modeling labor force selection in order to accurately 
estimate wages. Tax information by each state over time is needed in order to correctly estimate 
the change in fuel price. State taxes do not vary much over 2016-2018, with only 15 states 
introducing changes to their state tax rate.  
Finally, information on the purchases of electric vehicles is not contained in the CEX, nor 
does it contain information on what kind of car a person owns. The overarching assumption I am 
making is that most households are consuming gasoline powered cars.  I simulate electric vehicle 
purchasing decisions by modifying household purchases of gasoline. My analyses can’t make 
any comments on purchases of hybrid vehicles (vehicles that consume both gasoline and 
electricity).    
My analyses feature 1- and 2-Adult households. I further restrict my sample to include 
only adults between 18-64 who are working; working individuals are most likely to regularly 
make use of some mode of transportation. The results presented will, therefore, only be 
generalizable to working individuals in this age range. Table XIV presents the summary 
characteristics of households. There are 4,342 1-adult household level observations and 3,962 2-
                                                
27Bureau of Labor Statistics (2020); https://www.bls.gov/lau/rdscnp16.htm and Federation of 
Tax Administrators (2020); https://www.taxadmin.org/current-tax-rates 
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adult household observations. There are several differences between these 2016-2018 samples 
and the samples in West and Williams (2004) who use data between 1996-1998. My sample is 
younger, with an average age of 40 for both household types compared to 41 and 44 in West and 
Williams, even when keeping the age range the same. Respondents consumed slightly more 
gasoline -- 13.78 and 24.67 then vs 15.27 and 26.71 now. The sample is much more diverse with 
much less white non-Hispanic representation in the 2016-2018 sample.  
IV.  Methodology 
There are several steps in order to get from the demand system to tax incidence and then 
simulations of electric car purchases. First, I estimate a baseline demand system. Then, I 
calculate measures of tax incidence, under differing distributive assumptions, when the national 
gas tax is increased. Finally, I then simulate PEV purchases by decreasing households purchases 
of gasoline. The goal is to see how the tax incidence changes as PEV purchases increase, 
primarily among the wealthy. 
 IV.A. Demand System  
 Because I need to incorporate behavioral responses into my measures of tax incidence, I 
estimate an “Almost Ideal Demand System” (AIDS) popularized Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). 
Like West and Williams (2004), I estimate a linear AIDS. This type of demand system relies on 
the expenditure function. It is detailed below: 
log $ %, ' = 1 − ' log a , + ' ∗ log b , 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 1  
log 1 % = 23 + 24 log 54 +
1
2 748 log 54 log 58
844
000000000000000000000000000(2) 
log ; % = log 1 % + <3 54
=>
4
000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000(3) 
 
75 
 
Equation (1) is a consumer’s (household’s) expenditure function. % indicates a vector of prices 
and ' is the household's level of utility. Equations (2) and (3) are the specific functional forms 
used by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). I obtain demand equations for the three goods 
considered -- gasoline, leisure, and all other expenditures -- by applying Shepherds Lemma. 
These are the resulting estimating equations.  
@AB = 2A + 7A8 log 58B + <A log
CB
DB8
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000(4) 
 
Equation (4) is the share of the household h's income on spent on good F, which is a function of 
prices for all good consumed, 58, and real income, 
GH
IH
. DB is a non-linear price index described by 
household ℎ.  
log DB = 23 + 24 log 54B +
1
2 748 log(54B) log 58B
484
0000000000000000000000000000000000 5  
The system can be estimated using techniques developed by Poi (2012) for the statistical 
software Stata called quaids. This command allows users to estimate equation (4) with 
demographic and other controls. Since all expenditure shares must sum to one, the following 
requirements must be met: 2A (the budget share’s intercept) sum to 1, all 7A8 sum to zero, all <A 
sum to zero, and  7A8 = 78A (Slutsky Symmetry). Equation (4) is modified to include an additional 
vector of covariates (LB), including standard demographic information, educational outcomes, 
number of children, and state fixed effects; and the family's a propensity to consume gasoline 
(calculated by estimating a choice model of gasoline):  
@AB = 2A + 7A8 log 58B + <A log
CB
DB
+ MALB + NAOB
8
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000(4′) 
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The propensity to consume gasoline (OB)  is a regressor that is constructed by estimating a probit 
model, using the CEX, where the observed dependent variable is equal to one if the household is 
observed to be consuming gasoline and zero otherwise. This allows the parameter estimates to be 
generalized to the population even though equation (4') is estimated only using households who 
consume a positive amount of gasoline West and Williams (2004).The propensity for a 
household to consume gasoline are not directly available in the CEX.28 Therefore, before I 
estimate the demand system described by equation (4’) which includes a household’s propensity 
to consume gasoline estimated with a probit model. Net wages are calculated by using 
household’s marginal tax rate (estimate by using NBER’s Taxsim software). More details on 
these two preliminary steps are detailed Appendix C Tables C-I-C-III. 
            IV.B. Tax Incidence 
   Following West and Williams (2004), I estimate the model using three types of goods: 
gasoline, leisure, and  other goods. I do not directly estimate demand for electricity. When I 
simulate household’s switching to electric vehicles, I let the value of their expenditure share of 
gasoline transfer to the “other good” which includes electricity. This is because the gasoline to 
electricity tradeoff from switching is not known with certainty.  Furthermore, Equation (4’) is 
estimated separately for both single adult households and two-adult households (ones with a 
female and male adult). Households are then split up by income level, which is calculated as total 
expenditures. Doing so allows me to see how elasticity for gasoline and other goods changes 
with income and by household type.  
                                                
28 I estimate net wages to not only match West and Williams (2004) methodology but to also 
estimate a labor tax cut in future versions of this paper.  
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Next, I formulate measures of tax incidence. There are several incidence measures that 
can measure the tax burden. I focus on a consumer surplus with heterogeneous demand 
elasticities and an incidence measure where demand is unresponsive to price changes. These are 
two incidence measures detailed in West and Williams (2004) and presented here with slight 
modifications. The change in consumer surplus (Q0RSB) measure with heterogeneous demand 
elasticities takes the following form:  
Q0RSB =
TU5B
U
VB
U + 1
1 −
5B
U
5B
U
WH
XYZ
+ [U00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 6  
where, ℎ is the representative household for a given quartile, TU is mean expenditure share of 
gasoline before the price change, 5B
U is the mean price of gasoline before the price change, 5B
U is 
the mean price of gasoline after the price ,  VB
U is the uncompensated own price elasticity of 
demand for gasoline, and [U is a lump sum transfer to each household from the increased 
revenue from increasing the gasoline tax. All I need for the above equation: (1) spending on the 
taxed good before the tax imposition; (2) Percent change in the price induced by the tax; (3) the 
lump sum transfer to each household; (4) Own price elasticity of a good whose price changes. 
This measure requires a demand system to be estimated.  
The second incidence measure, where demand is unresponsive to price takes the 
following form (all terms are defined above):  
]^$F_`^$` = 5B
U − 5B
U TB
U + [U0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000(7) 
This measure does not require the estimation of a demand system. This is meant to act as a 
baseline to the demand response/consumer surplus measure. The no-demand response is the 
price change less the lump sum tax (if that is the revenue policy).  
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V. Simulations and Discussions 
V.A. Baseline Estimate 
I first estimate a demand system on expenditures related to gasoline, other goods, and 
leisure in order to get estimates of demand elasticities to use in the simulations. For each 
household type, all adult members are observed to be working. The demand system estimates 
from equation (4’) are detailed in Appendix C Tables C-II-C-III. Table XV and XVI list the 
uncompensated and compensated demand elasticities and cross-price elasticities for 1- and 2-
Adult Households evaluated at the means of all variables used in the AIDS model for each model 
specification (i.e., 1-adult households in the 1st income quartile of 1-adult households)29.  The 
model is estimated separately by income quartile and family type. Generally, the elasticity of 
gasoline is more inelastic at higher income levels. This pattern is consistent with estimates by 
West and Williams (2004) who find that upper-income levels have lower responses to changes in 
gasoline prices. However, the aforementioned work found a more consistent downward trend as 
household income increased, whereas, there are some instances where the middle household 
income quartiles have larger absolute elasticities. This is in direct contrast to Spiller et al., 
(2017), who find higher income households are relatively more price sensitive to changes in 
gasoline prices. Part of the difference between Spiller et al. (2017) and West and Williams 
(2004) and therefore, the current work, is that the elasticities in this paper and West and Williams 
(2004) are short run elasticities that do not allow for households to respond to increases in 
gasoline prices by switching to more fuel efficient vehicles. Contrastingly, the Spiller et al. 
(2017) model of calculating elasticity accounts for optimal vehicles miles travelled.  
                                                
29 Since these are not direct parameter estimates, bootstrapping would be required to obtain 
confidence intervals for these estimates 
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 Once the demand system is estimated, I estimate tax incidence using equations (6) and 
(7). In the consumer surplus measure, the only price change I consider is the gas tax and I utilize 
the uncompensated demand elasticity for gasoline. I simulate an increase the national gasoline 
tax to $1.39 which was the value chosen in West and Williams (2004), which is the optimal tax 
amount given damages from gasoline powered vehicles. This $1.39 increase in gasoline from the 
current $0.184 represents a 600% increase in the tax rate. State gasoline taxes are assumed to 
remain unchanged. 
I follow two assumptions about what is done with gas tax revenue once it’s been 
collected: it is either discarded or it is given back as a lump sum to all households. In the tax 
incidence measure where no lump sum is given, this simply means that [U = 0. The baseline tax 
incidences are detailed in Tables XVII and XVIII. These numbers represent the incidence as a 
percent share of total income. These numbers are calculated using a “representative household” 
from each quartile, where the representative household in each quartile faces the mean prices and 
mean expenditures of that quartile. Consistent with West and Williams (2004), for both 
incidence measures, demand response and no demand response, the gasoline tax is highly 
regressive 
As seen in Tables XVII and XVIII, welfare measures are represented as a percentage of 
total expenditures. The larger and more negative welfare measure, the more the representative 
household “loses” from the policy change. However, once revenue is recycled via a lump sum 
and transferred, lower quartiles actually benefit from the policy change, while households in 
higher quartiles still experience a welfare loss, albeit less than when revenue is disregarded.  
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V.B. Simulation 1: Gasoline Purchases Cut by 99% by Top Quartile 
 Before I present the results of the simulations, it is important to note that since I do not 
explicitly see electric vehicle purchases and therefore do not account for the potential include of 
subsidies included for purchases of electric vehicles. All simulations abstract away from any tax 
credit resulting from the purchase of a PEV. In this demand system, a decreased demand for 
gasoline increases demand for electricity. Since I am unable to calculate how dollars of gasoline 
translate into dollars of electricity power for a car that is driven the same amount, I simulate 
electric car purchases by letting gasoline consumption transfer over into the “share of other 
goods” purchased, which includes electricity purchases.  My first simulation of electric car 
purchases is an extreme case where each household in the 4th quartile decreases their purchase 
of gasoline by 99%.30 Therefore, this decrease simulates an almost total switch from gasoline to 
other goods (i.e., electricity).  
 Tables XIX and XX detail the tax incidence from this simulation for the 1- and 2-Adult 
households. While not shown here, each simulation requires a re-estimation of the demand 
system. Note that since consumption patterns were assumed to not change in the first three 
quartiles, the tax incidence when revenue is disregarded is unchanged from the baseline. 
However, since households in the fourth quartile are consuming virtually no gasoline, their 
incidence when revenue is disregarded essentially goes to zero. 
 Additionally, when there is no demand response, the lump sum transfer retains its 
progressive nature even with most of the top quartile no longer consuming gasoline but still 
receiving the lump sum transfer.  However, when the top quartile essentially no longer consumes 
any gasoline but still receives a lump sum, the tax continues to be regressive. In other words, 
                                                
30 I don't take gasoline consumption to zero, since in a demand system with zero purchase of a 
good, observations will drop out of the estimation. 
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previously when revenue is recycled in the consumer surplus model, this makes a regressive tax 
progressive. However, if a large enough portion of the consumer base no longer consumes 
gasoline but is given the lump sum tax, the regressive tax remains regressive.     
V.C. Simulation 2: Gasoline Purchases Cut for All Quartile 
 The final simulation is to decreases gasoline purchases for households in all quartiles. 
The bottom quartiles has 2% of its sample decrease their gasoline consumption by 99%, the 
second to bottom quartiles has 4% of its sample decrease their gasoline consumption by 99%, the 
second to the highest quartile has 6% of its sample decrease gasoline purchase by 99% and the 
top quartile has 8% of its sample decrease their gasoline consumption by 99%. Which 
households decrease gasoline consumption is determined randomly and the demand estimation 
and incidence estimation processes are repeated twenty-five times. The averaged results are 
found in Tables XXI and XXII.  
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VI. Conclusion 
 As the nature of private transportation changes, some thought needs to be given to how 
existing policies, such as gas taxes, affect the consumers who still pay those taxes. As more car 
manufactures develop Plug-In Electric vehicles (PEVs), there will be an incentive for consumers 
to switch to electric vehicles. Furthermore, as climate change becomes more of a pressing 
concern, PEVs are often promoted as eco-friendly, therefore increasing their appeal. In this 
paper, I estimate a consumer demand model to illicit elasticities to calculate tax incidence from a 
change in the national tax from $0.184 to $1.39 per gallon of gasoline. I then simulate two 
scenarios reflective of consumers changing their purchases of gasoline-powered vehicles to 
electric powered ones.  
 The incidence of the increase in gas tax is generally regressive because it is primarily 
wealthy households who purchase PEVs and, hence, avoid paying the higher gasoline tax. 
However, this tax can become more progressive if revenue is recycled as modeled here by a 
lump sum transfer to households. This is important because the gas tax is currently the main 
source of funding for federal highways. Going forward, if the policymakers attempt to recoup 
lost revenue from the gas tax due to households switching over to electric vehicles, special 
attention needs to be paid to persons who are still paying for that tax and the burden it places on 
them.  
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Figures 
Figure I: Sales of Plug-In Electric Vehicles 
   
Source: Alternative Fuels Data Center. 
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Figure II: Income Distribution by PEV Purchase 
 
Source: Tal and Nicholas (2016)
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Tables 
Table XIV: Chapter III Summary Statistics 
Variable 1-Adult HH 2-Adult HH 
Age (Age Female) 41.58 39.78 
 [13.3] [11.28] 
Age Male -- 40.99 
  [11.54] 
Share Female 0.54 -- 
 [0.5]  
Log(Real Income) 6.62 7.22 
 [0.51] [0.46] 
Hourly Wage  
(Hourly Wage Female) 10.59 8.1 
 [2.94] [2.13] 
Hourly Wage Male -- 10.46 
  [2.6] 
Gasoline Price 2.37 2.38 
 [0.41] [0.41] 
Other Good Price 1.06 1.06 
 [0.19] [0.19] 
Gasoline Per Week 16.12 26.75 
 [16.71] [22.82] 
Hours worked 
(Hours worked Female) 40.26 37.69 
 [11.99] [11.26] 
Hours worked Male -- 43.84 
 -- [10.52] 
Share of Expenditures in 
Leisure  
(Share of Expenditures on 
Leisure Female) 0.59 0.28 
 [0.17] [0.09] 
Share of Expenditures in 
Leisure Male  0.31 
  [0.1] 
Share Spent on Gasoline 0.02 0.02 
 [0.02] [0.01] 
Share of other goods 0.39 0.4 
 [0.17] [0.15] 
Number of Children 0.34 1.01 
 [0.8] [1.16] 
White, NH 65.56% 69.11% 
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 (White, NH Female) 
White, NH Male -- 70.08% 
Black, NH  
(Black, NH Female) 15.61% 6.60% 
Black, NH Male -- 7.81% 
Hispanic  
(Hispanic Female) 6.36% 8.62% 
Hispanic Male -- 7.22% 
Other, NH  
(Other, NH Female) 12.46% 15.67% 
Other Male -- 14.90% 
Share less than High School 
(Female) 5.02% 5.02% 
Share less High School Male -- 6.89% 
Share High School 18.62% 17.87% 
Share High School Male -- 22.19% 
Share >High School (Female) 76.36% 77.12% 
Share >High School Male  -- 70.72% 
Observations (Households) 4,983 4,047 
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Table XV: Baseline Demand Elasticities for 1-Adult Households 
 Compensated Uncompensated 
 Gas Price Wage  Other Good Price Gasoline Wage  Other Good Price 
Q=1 
Gasoline -1.19 -0.14 1.33 -1.19 -0.08 1.35 
Leisure 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.99 -0.27 
Other Good 0.09 0.03 -0.12 0.09 -0.04 -0.14 
Q=2 
Gasoline -0.63 -0.09 0.72 -0.63 -0.17 0.67 
Leisure 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.99 -0.49 
Other Good 0.04 0.02 -0.06 0.04 0.00 -0.07 
Q=3 
Gasoline -0.65 -0.05 0.7 -0.66 -0.11 0.65 
Leisure 0.00 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 -1.00 -0.73 
Other Good 0.03 0.04 -0.07 0.03 0.00 -0.09 
Q=4 
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 Compensated Uncompensated 
 Gas Price Wage  Other Good Price Gasoline Wage  Other Good Price 
Gasoline 0.11 -0.1 -0.01 0.12 -0.09 0.01 
Leisure -0.01 -0.23 0.23 -0.04 -0.96 -0.88 
Other Good 0.00 0.15 -0.15 -0.01 -0.02 -0.42 
Note: Elasticities where estimated using quaids command in Stata 16. Full system coefficients can be found in the appendix.  
These are elasticities evaluated at the means of the variables used in the demand system estimation and therefore do not have standard 
errors.  
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Table XVI: Baseline Demand Elasticities for 2-Adult Households 
 Compensated Uncompensated 
 Gas Price Wage 
 Male 
Wage  
Female 
Other Good 
Price 
Gas  
Price 
Wage  
Male 
Wage  
Female 
Other Good 
Price 
Q1 
Gasoline -0.82 0.1 0.16 0.56 -0.82 -0.03 0.05 0.49 
Male 
Leisure 
0.00 -0.5 0.42 0.08 -0.01 -0.98 -0.01 -0.2 
Female 
Leisure 
0.01 0.46 -0.57 0.10 -0.01 -0.02 -1.01 -0.19 
Other 
Good 
0.04 0.14 0.15 -0.32 0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.41 
Q2 
Gasoline -0.18 0 -0.03 0.21 -0.19 -0.03 -0.06 0.18 
Male 
Leisure 
0.00 -0.48 0.45 0.03 -0.03 -1.00 0.00 -0.47 
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Female 
Leisure 
0.00 0.52 -0.56 0.04 -0.03 0.01 -1.00 -0.45 
Other 
Good 
0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.08 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.11 
Q3 
Gasoline -0.91 0.02 0.04 0.86 -0.92 -0.05 -0.02 0.77 
Male 
Leisure 
0.00 -0.49 0.43 0.06 -0.03 -0.99 0.00 -0.66 
Female 
Leisure 
0.00 0.50 -0.57 0.06 -0.03 0.01 -0.99 -0.65 
Other 
Good 
0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.12 0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.19 
Q4 
Gasoline -0.86 -0.01 -0.03 0.9 -0.87 -0.06 -0.07 0.77 
Male 
Leisure 
0 -0.64 0.27 0.37 -0.02 -0.94 0.01 -0.46 
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Note: Elasticities where estimated using quaids command in Stata 16. Full system coefficients can be found in the appendix.  
These are elasticities evaluated at the means of the variables used in the demand system estimation and therefore do not have standard 
errors.  
 
 
  
Female 
Leisure 
0 0.31 -0.73 0.42 -0.03 0.01 -0.99 -0.41 
Other 
Good 
0.02 0.14 0.13 -0.29 0.01 -0.02 0 -0.72 
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Table XVII: Baseline Estimated Tax Incidence: 1 Adult Households 
Tax Incidence Measure Q=1 Q=2 Q=3 Q=4 
Revenue is Disregarded 
No Demand Response -2.61% -2.01% -1.69% -1.06% 
Consumer Surplus -4.62% -4.30% -3.62% -3.37% 
Revenue is Return via Lump Sum Transfer 
No Demand Response 3.94% 1.65% 0.65% -0.03% 
Consumer Surplus 1.93% -0.64% -1.28% -2.33% 
Note: Tax Incidence as a percentage of total expenditures 
Table XVIII: Baseline Estimated Tax Incidence: 2 Adult Households 
Tax Incidence Measure Q=1 Q=2 Q=3 Q=4 
Revenue is Disregarded 
No Demand Response -2.40% -1.89% -1.70% -0.94% 
Consumer Surplus -4.89% -5.32% -3.41% -1.93% 
Revenue is Return via Lump Sum Transfer 
No Demand Response 3.35% 1.47% 0.51% 0.07% 
Consumer Surplus 0.55% -2.14% -1.32% -0.98% 
Note: Tax Incidence as a percentage of total expenditures 
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Table XIX: Gasoline Cut Top Quartile- Estimated Tax Incidence: 1 Adult Households 
Tax Incidence Measure Q=1 Q=2 Q=3 Q=4 
Revenue is Disregarded 
No Demand Response -2.61% -2.01% -1.69% -0.01% 
Consumer Surplus -4.62% -4.30% -3.62% -0.03% 
Revenue is Return via Lump Sum Transfer 
No Demand Response 7.74% 3.77% 2.01% 1.63% 
Consumer Surplus -0.55% -2.03% -2.16% 0.61% 
Note: Tax Incidence as a percentage of total expenditures 
Table XX: Gasoline Cut Top Quartile- Estimated Tax Incidence: 2 Adult Households 
Tax Incidence Measure Q=1 Q=2 Q=3 Q=4 
Revenue is Disregarded 
No Demand Response -2.40% -1.89% -1.70% -0.01% 
Consumer Surplus -4.95 -5.4 -3.42 -0.02 
Revenue is Return via Lump Sum Transfer 
No Demand Response 1.36% 0.31% -0.26% 0.65% 
Consumer Surplus -1.2 -3.2 -1.98 0.64 
Note: Tax Incidence as a percentage of total expenditures 
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Table XXI: Gasoline Cut All Quartiles- Estimated Tax Incidence: 1 Adult Households 
Tax Incidence Measure Q=1 Q=2 Q=3 Q=4 
Revenue is Disregarded 
No Demand Response -2.55% -1.93% -1.59% -0.98% 
Consumer Surplus -4.12% -6.17% -5.86% -12.69% 
Revenue is Return via Lump Sum Transfer 
No Demand Response 3.65% 1.53% 0.62% 0.00% 
Consumer Surplus 2.05% -2.72% -3.65% -12.71% 
Note: Tax Incidence as a percentage of total expenditures 
 
Table XXII: Gasoline Cut All Quartiles- Estimated Tax Incidence: 2 Adult Households 
Tax Incidence Measure Q=1 Q=2 Q=3 Q=4 
Revenue is Disregarded 
No Demand Response -2.35% -1.82% -1.60% -0.87% 
Consumer Surplus -5.64% -16.04% -3.61% -2.65% 
Revenue is Return via Lump Sum Transfer 
No Demand Response 3.08% 1.35% 0.48% 0.09% 
Consumer Surplus -0.2% -12.86% -1.52% -1.69% 
Note: Tax Incidence as a percentage of total expenditures  
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Appendix A-Chapter I  
Table A-I: Parameter estimates from the social capital equation 
VARIABLES Trust Weak Network Strong 
Network 
Individual Controls    
Age 0.0453 -0.1108* -0.2767*** 
 [0.0692] [0.0641] [0.0668] 
Age squared -0.0005 0.0030** 0.0049*** 
 [0.0015] [0.0014] [0.0015] 
Age cubed  0.0324 -0.2313** -0.2824*** 
 [0.1056] [0.0983] [0.1024] 
Married=0,1 0.1594*** 0.0634 -0.0693 
 [0.058] [0.0535] [0.0549] 
Number of children in HH -0.0359 0.1275*** -0.0482* 
 [0.0257] [0.0208] [0.0281] 
Household total income GE 
$30,000=0,1 
0.3276*** 0.3806*** 0.2673*** 
 [0.0671] [0.0607] [0.0598] 
High school education=0,1 0.2507** 0.3495*** 0.2033** 
 [0.1197] [0.1022] [0.099] 
Some college education=0,1 0.4651*** 0.8726*** 0.4135*** 
 [0.1207] [0.1035] [0.0971] 
College graduate=0,1 0.8543*** 1.422*** 0.6385*** 
 [0.1601] [0.1411] [0.1449] 
Hispanic=0,1 -0.6352*** -0.2978** -0.6948*** 
 [0.1312] [0.1224] [0.1224] 
Black, non-Hispanic=0,1 -0.9815*** 0.1314 -0.8214*** 
 [0.1276] [0.1113] [0.1154] 
Other race, non-Hispanic=0,1 -0.1867 -0.4259** -0.7741*** 
 [0.198] [0.1744] [0.2260] 
Unemployed=0,1 -0.2487** -0.3218*** -0.2694** 
 [0.1107] [0.1122] [0.1248] 
Not in the labor force=0,1 0.0584 0.0287 0.1533** 
 [0.0714] [0.064] [0.0618] 
Citizen=0,1 0.2224* 0.6006*** 0.3660*** 
 [0.1256] [0.1296] [0.1247] 
Lived in area 5 yrs or less=0,1 
 
-0.1400*** -0.2226*** -0.3043*** 
 [0.0505] [0.0502] [0.0499] 
Own home=0,1 
 
0.4438*** 0.3723*** 0.2480** 
 [0.1145] [0.1085] [0.1023] 
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VARIABLES Trust Weak Network Strong 
Network 
Female=0,1 
 
0.1822*** 0.0079 0.0663 
 [0.0498] [0.0455] [0.0458] 
College grad * white non-
Hispanic 
 
0.3860*** 0.0652 0.0194 
 [0.1253] [0.1127] [0.1206] 
College grad * own home -0.3210*** -0.081 -0.3039*** 
 [0.1019] [0.0972] [0.0949] 
White non-Hispanic * own 
home 
-0.172 -0.1186 -0.3269*** 
 [0.1293] [0.1187] [0.1176] 
Age GE 75 years -0.0312 0.3442 -0.0288 
 [0.3273] [0.2929] [0.2863] 
Age LT 25 years 0.1904 0.3443** 0.0175 
 [0.1463] [0.1402] [0.1521] 
Regional Controls    
Live in MSA=0,1 -0.1212 -0.0131 -0.0975 
 [0.0791] [0.0727] [0.0718] 
Mid-Atlantic region=0,1 0.1511 -0.2647* -0.0564 
 [0.1676] [0.1514] [0.1564] 
East North Central region=0,1 0.3668** 0.0125 0.0329 
 [0.1829] [0.1692] [0.1747] 
West North Central region=0,1 0.0573 -0.4085** -0.0046 
 [0.2136] [0.1992] [0.1960] 
South Atlantic region=0,1 0.1644 0.0407 -0.1436 
 [0.2215] [0.2038] [0.1927] 
East South Central region=0,1 0.2169 -0.0174 0.0329 
 [0.2444] [0.2353] [0.2181] 
West South Central region=0,1 0.3064 0.1301 0.3535 
 [0.2705] [0.252] [0.232] 
Mountain region=0,1 0.4071* 0.0057 0.2602 
 [0.2418] [0.2272] [0.2014] 
Pacific region=0,1 0.3086 -0.0263 0.3196 
 [0.2536] [0.235] [0.2195] 
Distance Weighted Census 
Tract Characteristics 
(Exogenous Regressors) 
   
Share of workers in broad 
social capital occupations 
3.127 6.101 4.541 
 [5.555] [5.176] [4.937] 
Share of workers in social -2.111 32.38** 16.32 
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VARIABLES Trust Weak Network Strong 
Network 
capital industries 
 [14.85] [14.43] [13.71] 
Labor force participation rate 2.072 -5.242 -14.81 
 [9.642] [8.767] [9.195] 
Unemployment rate -11.72* 4.522 -11.31* 
 [6.413] [5.917] [6.214] 
Percent lived in area at least 5 
years 
1.664 -4.145*** -0.9244 
 [1.657] [1.429] [1.515] 
Median age 0.0995* 0.0256 -0.0509 
 [0.0536] [0.0546] [0.0544] 
Diversity index -1.08 0.9485 -0.3008 
 [0.9963] [0.9398] [0.9243] 
Female labor force 
participation rate 
-1.316 6.956 13.79* 
 [8.155] [7.528] [8.028] 
Percent college graduates, 25 
and older 
2.403 0.2479 -3.795* 
 [2.536] [2.180] [2.275] 
Population density (1000/sq 
mi) 
-0.005 0.0398 0.0259 
 [0.0436] [0.0419] [0.04] 
Percent married households 2.162 -0.4471 0.058 
 [1.924] [1.761] [1.723] 
Percent of families with own 
children 
6.819** 0.2388 -2.473 
 [3.236] [3.024] [2.909] 
Percent who own home 0.3233 2.308 0.7157 
 [1.566] [1.439] [1.450] 
Median household income 
($00000) 
-0.6543 -0.2507 1.876 
 [1.722] [1.479] [1.476] 
    
Observations 20,220 20,220 20,220 
Pseudo R2 0.0999 0.0679 0.051 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets, etc. Parameter estimates from ordered logit estimations. 
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Appendix B-Chapter II 
Table B-I: Amenity Establishments 
NAICS Description Code NAICS Description Code 
Supermarkets and Other Grocery 
(except Convenience) Stores 445110 Florists 453110 
Baked Goods Stores 445291 
Office Supplies and 
Stationery Stores 453210 
Confectionery and Nut Stores 445292 
Gift, Novelty, and Souvenir 
Stores 453220 
All Other Specialty Food Stores 445299 Used Merchandise Stores 453310 
Beer, Wine, and Liquor Stores 445310 Pet and Pet Supplies Stores 453910 
Pharmacies and Drug Stores 446110 Art Dealers 453920 
Cosmetics, Beauty Supplies, and 
Perfume Stores 446120 
Theater Companies and 
Dinner Theaters 711110 
Food (Health) Supplement Stores 446191 Dance Companies 711120 
All Other Health and Personal Care 
Stores 446199 Musical Groups and Artists 711130 
Men’s Clothing Stores 448110 
Other Performing Arts 
Companies 711190 
Women’s Clothing Stores 448120 
Independent Artists, Writers, 
and Performers 711510 
Children’s and Infants’ Clothing 
Stores 448130 Museums 712110 
Family Clothing Stores 448140 Historical Sites 712120 
Clothing Accessories Stores 448150 Zoos and Botanical Gardens 712130 
Other Clothing Stores 448190 
Nature Parks and Other 
Similar Institutions 712190 
Shoe Stores 448210 
Fitness and Recreational 
Sports Centers 713940 
Jewelry Stores 448310 Bowling Centers 713950 
Luggage and Leather Goods Stores 448320 Bed-and-Breakfast Inns 721191 
Sporting Goods Stores 451110 
Drinking Places (Alcoholic 
Beverages) 722410 
Hobby, Toy, and Game Stores 451120 Full-Service Restaurants 722511 
Sewing, Needlework, and Piece 
Goods Stores 451130 Limited-Service Restaurants 722513 
Musical Instrument and Supplies 
Stores 451140 
Cafeterias, Grill Buffets, and 
Buffets 722514 
Book Stores 451211 
Snack and Nonalcoholic 
Beverage Bars 722515 
Beauty Salons 812112 Barber Shops 812112 
Nail Salons 812113 Other Personal Care 812199 
Pet Care 812910 
Civic and Social 
Organizations 813410 
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NAICS Description Code NAICS Description Code 
Dry-cleaning and Laundering 
Services 812320 Movie Theaters 512131 
    
Commercial Banking 522110 Credit Unions 522130 
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Table B-II: First Stage Results: OLS Estimation: Restricted Gentrification 
 Bottom 60% Top 40% Bottom 60% Top 20% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Gentrified %∆#$ Gentrified %∆#$ 
     
%&'(,*,+,,, 1.024*** 0.175*** 0.123*** 0.175*** 
 [0.0211] [0.0498] [0.00687] [0.0498] 
%∆-./0.12(,*,(+,,4,+,56) -0.00297 0.0502*** 0.000255 0.0502*** 
 [0.00331] [0.00779] [0.00108] [0.00779] 
%∆8/.9:-;0.(,*,(+,,4,+,56) -0.00484** -0.00241 -0.000976 -0.00241 
 [0.00221] [0.00521] [0.000720] [0.00521] 
%#$(,*,+,,, 0.0221 -0.936*** 0.00655 -0.936*** 
 [0.0180] [0.0423] [0.00584] [0.0423] 
Median Firm Age in 2014 4.63e-05 -0.00144*** 7.05e-05 -0.00144*** 
 [0.000132] [0.000310] [4.29e-05] [0.000310] 
Constant -0.118*** 0.644*** -0.0250*** 0.644*** 
 [0.0164] [0.0387] [0.00534] [0.0387] 
     
Observations 16,111 16,111 16,111 16,111 
Adjusted R-squared 0.134 0.077 0.026 0.077 
Note: Estimation is done via OLS. Standard errors are denoted in brackets. Gentrified=1 if the 
neighborhood meets the criterion described in equation (1) and (2). %∆#$ denotes the change in 
amenities as described in equation (4). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B-III: First Stage Results: OLS Estimation: Unrestricted Gentrification 
 Continuous Gentrification Binary Gentrification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Gentrified %∆#$ Gentrified %∆#$ 
     
%&'(,*,+,,, -0.0435*** 0.0676*** 0.0374** 0.0676*** 
 [0.00517] [0.0209] [0.0154] [0.0209] 
%∆-./0.12(,*,(+,,4,+,56) 0.00693*** 0.0206*** 0.00736** 0.0206*** 
 [0.00100] [0.00407] [0.00301] [0.00407] 
%∆8/.9:-;0.(,*,(+,,4,+,56) -0.00648*** -0.00253 -0.0168*** -0.00253 
 [0.000925] [0.00375] [0.00277] [0.00375] 
%#$(,*,+,,, 0.00821 -1.015*** 0.0210 -1.015*** 
 [0.00855] [0.0346] [0.0256] [0.0346] 
Median Firm Age in 2014 2.30e-05 -0.00126*** 0.000116 -0.00126*** 
 [6.48e-05] [0.000262] [0.000194] [0.000262] 
Constant 0.0108 0.676*** 0.377*** 0.676*** 
 [0.00789] [0.0320] [0.0236] [0.0320] 
     
Observations 26,139 26,139 26,139 26,139 
Adjusted R-squared 0.024 0.068 0.002 0.068 
Note: Estimation is done via OLS. Standard errors are denoted in brackets. Continuous 
gentrification is the measure described in equation (3). Binary gentrification is an indicator =1 if 
the neighborhood’s %∆&' is in the top 40% of the CBSA distribution of %∆&'. %∆#$ denotes 
the change in amenities as described in equation (4). This*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix C-Chapter III 
Table C-I: Gasoline Probit for 1-Adult Households and 2-Adult Households 
 1-Adult Households 2-Adult Households 
VARIABLES Gasoline Probit Gasoline Probit 
   
Log (Total Expenditures) 0.505*** 0.576*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0129) 
Age (or Age Female) 0.0176 -0.0530 
 (0.0112) (0.0374) 
Age Male  0.00846 
  (0.0345) 
Age2 (or Age2 Female -0.000209 0.000681 
 (0.000136) (0.000446) 
Age2 Male  -0.000141 
  (0.000414) 
Black, NH (or Black, NH Female) -0.248*** -0.152 
 (0.0534) (0.213) 
Black, NH Male  -0.361** 
  (0.176) 
Hispanic (or Hispanic Female) -0.340*** -0.0465 
 (0.0755) (0.146) 
Hispanic Male  0.118 
  (0.200) 
Other, NH (or Other, NH Female) 0.0329 0.190 
 (0.0648) (0.183) 
Other, NH Male  -0.0734 
  (0.141) 
High School (or High School Female) 0.161* 0.147 
 (0.0853) (0.175) 
High School Male  0.353** 
  (0.169) 
Some College (or Some College Female) 0.304*** 0.0962 
 (0.0830) (0.183) 
Some College Male  0.0980 
  (0.155) 
College (or College Female) 0.270*** 0.325** 
 (0.0854) (0.161) 
College Male  0.0223 
  (0.163) 
Married  -0.168**  
 (0.0700)  
Number of Children -0.00114 0.0358 
 (0.0277) (0.0397) 
Homeownership 0.635*** 0.497*** 
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 (0.0527) (0.0899) 
Log(Price of Gasoline) 0.564* 0.0515 
 (0.305) (0.690) 
Log(Price of Other Good) -0.925*** 0.509 
 (0.200) (1.627) 
Female -0.0426  
 (0.0425)  
Constant -4.322*** -2.663*** 
 (0.315) (0.800) 
   
Observations 11,841 10,860 
Note: This is done because some households may not consume gasoline. Standard errors in 
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C-II: Almost Ideal Demand System for 1-Adult Households 
Variables Equation Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
Age Gas -1.27e-05 -2.99e-05 -8.90e-07 4.59e-05 
  (1.08e-05) (2.20e-05) (3.00e-05) (4.45e-05) 
Age Leisure 0.000229** 0.000283 -1.28e-05 -0.000690** 
  (0.000106) (0.000176) (0.000186) (0.000281) 
Age Other -0.000216** -0.000253 1.37e-05 0.000644** 
  (9.83e-05) (0.000169) (0.000184) (0.000273) 
White, NH Gas -0.000393 0.00133 -0.00149 0.00286* 
  (0.000441) (0.00103) (0.00163) (0.00146) 
White, NH Leisure 0.00674 -0.0141 0.00476 -0.0194 
  (0.00469) (0.0111) (0.0128) (0.0123) 
White, NH Other -0.00635 0.0128 -0.00327 0.0166 
  (0.00438) (0.0106) (0.0123) (0.0120) 
Black, NH Gas 0.000976* 0.00178 -0.000355 0.00248 
  (0.000511) (0.00119) (0.00191) (0.00181) 
Black, NH Leisure -0.0109** -0.00637 -0.00203 0.00734 
  (0.00540) (0.0129) (0.0131) (0.0153) 
Black, NH Other 0.00994** 0.00458 0.00239 -0.00982 
  (0.00503) (0.0122) (0.0128) (0.0150) 
Hispanic Gas 0.000425 0.00259** 0.000165 0.00644*** 
  (0.000543) (0.00114) (0.00194) (0.00220) 
Hispanic Leisure -0.00180 -0.0152 0.0106 -0.00815 
  (0.00563) (0.0118) (0.0132) (0.0150) 
Hispanic Other 0.00138 0.0126 -0.0108 0.00171 
  (0.00523) (0.0112) (0.0127) (0.0145) 
High School Gas -0.00143** 0.00142 -0.000807 0.00305 
  (0.000631) (0.00130) (0.00352) (0.00488) 
High School Leisure 0.00661 0.00694 -0.00731 -0.0586** 
  (0.00461) (0.00907) (0.0126) (0.0260) 
High School Other -0.00518 -0.00835 0.00811 0.0556** 
  (0.00423) (0.00874) (0.0130) (0.0263) 
Some 
College Gas 
-0.00146** -0.000312 -0.00299 -0.00115 
  (0.000568) (0.00128) (0.00347) (0.00431) 
Some 
College Leisure 
0.00686** 0.00919 0.0139 -0.0533** 
  (0.00347) (0.00935) (0.0112) (0.0258) 
Some 
College Other 
-0.00540* -0.00888 -0.0110 0.0544** 
  (0.00319) (0.00903) (0.0118) (0.0261) 
College Gas -0.00171*** -0.00178 -0.00543 -0.00141 
  (0.000600) (0.00133) (0.00350) (0.00426) 
College Leisure 0.00793* 0.0140 0.0312*** -0.0295 
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Variables Equation Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
  (0.00407) (0.00976) (0.0117) (0.0249) 
College Other -0.00622 -0.0123 -0.0258** 0.0309 
  (0.00379) (0.00937) (0.0121) (0.0253) 
Female Gas -1.48e-05 -0.000857 -0.000879 -0.000995 
  (0.000316) (0.000587) (0.000763) (0.00108) 
Female Leisure -0.00346 -0.00146 -0.0253*** -0.0153** 
  (0.00331) (0.00476) (0.00468) (0.00637) 
Female Other 0.00348 0.00231 0.0262*** 0.0163*** 
  (0.00307) (0.00449) (0.00461) (0.00618) 
Real Income Gas 0.00131*** 0.00327** 0.00810*** 0.000897 
  (0.000335) (0.00166) (0.00219) (0.00145) 
Real Income Leisure -0.0409*** -0.143*** -0.261*** -0.198*** 
  (0.00455) (0.00826) (0.00920) (0.0193) 
Real Income Other 0.0396*** 0.140*** 0.253*** 0.198*** 
  (0.00440) (0.00810) (0.00915) (0.0195) 
Number of 
Children Gas 
0.000469*** 0.000600 -0.000258 -0.000298 
  (0.000142) (0.000473) (0.000838) (0.000870) 
Number of 
Children Leisure 
-0.00356*** 0.00106 0.0134*** 0.0160*** 
  (0.00133) (0.00327) (0.00394) (0.00574) 
Number of 
Children Other 
0.00309** -0.00166 -0.0132*** -0.0157*** 
  (0.00124) (0.00314) (0.00382) (0.00563) 
Gas 
Propensity Gas 
-0.00225** -0.00131 0.00372 -0.00123 
  (0.00111) (0.00342) (0.00522) (0.0107) 
Gas 
Propensity Leisure 
0.0170** -0.0523** -0.0730** -0.248*** 
  (0.00851) (0.0254) (0.0311) (0.0760) 
Gas 
Propensity Other 
-0.0147* 0.0536** 0.0693** 0.249*** 
  (0.00787) (0.0243) (0.0307) (0.0734) 
α Gas 0.0831*** 0.0496*** 0.0420*** 0.0314*** 
  (0.0110) (0.00832) (0.00664) (0.0105) 
α Leisure -0.0948** -0.00572 -0.00511 -0.0398*** 
  (0.0380) (0.00606) (0.00321) (0.00962) 
α Other 1.012*** 0.956*** 0.963*** 1.008*** 
  (0.0355) (0.0103) (0.00777) (0.0129) 
β Gas -0.0218*** -0.0343*** -0.0656*** -0.0318* 
  (0.00352) (0.0127) (0.0163) (0.0187) 
β Leisure 0.455*** 1.278*** 2.229*** 1.950*** 
  (0.0374) (0.0555) (0.0653) (0.173) 
β Other -0.433*** -1.243*** -2.163*** -1.918*** 
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Variables Equation Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
  (0.0364) (0.0542) (0.0652) (0.177) 
γ Gas, Gas -0.00409 0.00568 0.00581 0.0204 
  (0.00539) (0.00660) (0.00695) (0.0128) 
γ 
Gas, 
Leisure 
0.00106 -0.00328*** -0.00220** 0.000448 
  (0.000810) (0.00111) (0.000914) (0.00113) 
γ Gas, Other 0.00302 -0.00240 -0.00361 -0.0209 
  (0.00544) (0.00678) (0.00695) (0.0129) 
γ 
Leisure, 
Leisure 
-0.0182** 0.0109 0.00639 -0.0224*** 
  (0.00715) (0.00713) (0.00478) (0.00816) 
γ 
Leisure 
Other 
0.0171** -0.00760 -0.00418 0.0219*** 
  (0.00669) (0.00663) (0.00462) (0.00779) 
γ 
Other, 
Other 
-0.0202** 0.01000 0.00779 -0.00103 
  -1.27e-05 (0.00920) (0.00864) (0.0147) 
Observations  1,252 1,243 1,247 1,241 
Notes: Includes state and year fixed effects not shown here. Robust standard errors are 
clustered by households. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C-III: Almost Ideal Demand System for 2-Adult Households 
Variables Good Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
Age Female Gas 0.000344** -0.000294* -0.000580** 0.000198** 
  (0.000142) (0.000171) (0.000228) (8.17e-05) 
Age Female 
Leisure-
Male 
-0.00385*** -0.00265** 0.00272** -0.000666 
  (0.000979) (0.00109) (0.00108) (0.000414) 
Age Female 
Leisure-
Female 
0.00322*** 0.00309*** 0.00315*** -2.75e-05 
  (0.000928) (0.000993) (0.00100) (0.000369) 
Age Female Other 0.000284 -0.000152 -0.00529*** 0.000496 
  (0.000864) (0.00128) (0.00114) (0.000639) 
Age Male Gas -0.000780*** 1.47e-05 0.000193 4.02e-05 
  (0.000157) (0.000169) (0.000224) (7.98e-05) 
Age Male 
Leisure-
Male 
0.00922*** 0.00529*** 0.00560*** -8.03e-05 
  (0.000935) (0.00106) (0.00106) (0.000403) 
Age Male 
Leisure-
Female 
0.00138 -0.00335*** -0.000797 -0.000486 
  (0.000878) (0.000981) (0.000985) (0.000357) 
Age Male Other -0.00982*** -0.00196 -0.00500*** 0.000526 
  (0.000724) (0.00122) (0.00109) (0.000620) 
Age2 
Female Gas 
-6.21e-06*** 2.84e-06 6.86e-06** -2.07e-06** 
  (1.82e-06) (2.16e-06) (2.74e-06) (9.40e-07) 
Age2 
Female 
Leisure-
Male 
5.86e-05*** 3.42e-05** -2.61e-05** 7.75e-06 
  (1.21e-05) (1.39e-05) (1.31e-05) (4.77e-06) 
Age2 
Female 
Leisure-
Female 
-2.47e-05** -3.54e-05*** -3.56e-05*** -3.20e-07 
  (1.14e-05) (1.26e-05) (1.21e-05) (4.25e-06) 
Age2 
Female Other 
-2.77e-05** -1.66e-06 5.49e-05*** -5.36e-06 
  (1.08e-05) (1.63e-05) (1.40e-05) (7.37e-06) 
Age2 Male Gas 1.13e-05*** 3.53e-07 -2.55e-06 -6.05e-07 
  (2.12e-06) (2.07e-06) (2.65e-06) (9.06e-07) 
Age2 Male 
Leisure-
Male 
-0.000124*** -6.30e-05*** -7.04e-05*** 1.47e-06 
  (1.18e-05) (1.31e-05) (1.27e-05) (4.54e-06) 
Age2 Male 
Leisure-
Female 
-3.42e-05*** 3.85e-05*** 9.65e-06 6.67e-06* 
  (1.10e-05) (1.20e-05) (1.17e-05) (4.01e-06) 
Age2 Male Other 0.000147*** 2.41e-05 6.33e-05*** -7.53e-06 
  (9.25e-06) (1.51e-05) (1.31e-05) (6.96e-06) 
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Variables Good Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
White, NH 
Female Gas 
-0.00283*** -0.00191** -0.00266 -9.56e-05 
  (0.000645) (0.000949) (0.00168) (0.000550) 
White, NH 
Female 
Leisure-
Male 
0.00886** -0.0107** 0.00894 8.65e-05 
  (0.00414) (0.00493) (0.00680) (0.00193) 
White, NH 
Female 
Leisure-
Female 
0.0217*** 0.00782 -0.00571 0.00164 
  (0.00386) (0.00476) (0.00657) (0.00178) 
White, NH 
Female Other 
-0.0278*** 0.00475*** -0.000579 -0.00163 
  (0.00184) (0.00163) (0.00286) (0.00184) 
White, NH 
Male Gas 
0.00262*** -0.000847 0.000542 0.000585 
  (0.000629) (0.000835) (0.00131) (0.000420) 
White, NH 
Male 
Leisure-
Male 
-0.00862** -0.00265 0.00254 -0.000673 
  (0.00413) (0.00433) (0.00529) (0.00147) 
White, NH 
Male 
Leisure-
Female 
-0.0121*** 0.00351 -0.00142 -0.000155 
  (0.00386) (0.00419) (0.00511) (0.00136) 
White, NH 
Male Other 
0.0181*** -1.24e-05 -0.00166 0.000243 
  (0.00179) (0.00142) (0.00223) (0.00141) 
Black, NH 
Female Gas 
-0.00259*** -0.00119 -0.00348** -0.000307 
  (0.000605) (0.000933) (0.00169) (0.000551) 
Black, NH 
Female 
Leisure-
Male 
-0.0143*** -0.0144*** 0.00266 -0.00166 
  (0.00440) (0.00484) (0.00680) (0.00192) 
Black, NH 
Female 
Leisure-
Female 
0.0195*** 0.0143*** 0.00209 0.00325* 
  (0.00398) (0.00468) (0.00657) (0.00178) 
Black, NH 
Female Other 
-0.00264 0.00127 -0.00127 -0.00128 
  (0.00302) (0.00159) (0.00286) (0.00183) 
Black, NH 
Male Gas 
0.000940 -0.00158* -0.000661 0.000104 
  (0.000630) (0.000839) (0.00134) (0.000417) 
Black, NH 
Male 
Leisure-
Male 
0.00777* -0.00340 0.0139** 0.00352** 
  (0.00436) (0.00433) (0.00549) (0.00146) 
Black, NH 
Male 
Leisure-
Female 
-0.0103** -0.0114*** -0.00991* -0.000361 
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Variables Good Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
  (0.00407) (0.00416) (0.00528) (0.00135) 
Black, NH 
Male Other 
0.00156 0.0164*** -0.00328 -0.00326** 
  (0.00270) (0.00222) (0.00309) (0.00140) 
Hispanic 
Female Gas 
-0.00254*** -0.00189** -0.00435** -0.000141 
  (0.000659) (0.000959) (0.00169) (0.000555) 
Hispanic 
Female 
Leisure-
Male 
-0.0371*** -0.0227*** -0.00323 -0.00280 
  (0.00470) (0.00502) (0.00687) (0.00203) 
Hispanic 
Female 
Leisure-
Female 
0.0312*** 0.0261*** 0.0196*** 0.00435** 
  (0.00429) (0.00484) (0.00664) (0.00186) 
Hispanic 
Female Other 
0.00843** -0.00154 -0.0120*** -0.00141 
  (0.00340) (0.00233) (0.00345) (0.00220) 
Hispanic 
Male Gas 
-4.92e-05 -0.00266*** -0.00160 -0.000130 
  (0.000687) (0.000864) (0.00137) (0.000418) 
Hispanic 
Male 
Leisure-
Male 
0.0273*** 0.0129*** 0.0210*** 0.00524*** 
  (0.00481) (0.00436) (0.00541) (0.00157) 
Hispanic 
Male 
Leisure-
Female 
-0.0187*** -0.0183*** -0.0164*** -0.00128 
  (0.00447) (0.00422) (0.00524) (0.00144) 
Hispanic 
Male Other 
-0.00852*** 0.00800*** -0.00292 -0.00383** 
  (0.00277) (0.00144) (0.00230) (0.00174) 
High School 
Female Gas 
0.00172* -0.00153 -0.00117 0.000157 
  (0.00100) (0.000942) (0.00117) (0.000252) 
High School 
Female 
Leisure-
Male 
-0.0413*** -0.000692 0.0103** -0.00384*** 
  (0.00647) (0.00488) (0.00481) (0.00106) 
High School 
Female 
Leisure-
Female 
0.0126** 0.0168*** 0.0137*** 0.00352*** 
  (0.00611) (0.00472) (0.00463) (0.000934) 
High School 
Female Other 
0.0271*** -0.0146*** -0.0228*** 0.000165 
  (0.00315) (0.00160) (0.00279) (0.00136) 
High School 
Male Gas 
-0.000859 0.00101 -0.000317 0.000373 
  (0.00102) (0.00103) (0.00129) (0.000258) 
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Variables Good Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
High School 
Male 
Leisure-
Male 
0.0300*** 0.0171*** 0.00542 0.00270*** 
  (0.00711) (0.00541) (0.00520) (0.000879) 
High School 
Male 
Leisure-
Female 
-0.0230*** -0.00450 -0.00937* -0.00280*** 
  (0.00668) (0.00521) (0.00503) (0.000805) 
High School 
Male Other 
-0.00617* -0.0136*** 0.00427* -0.000272 
  (0.00359) (0.00247) (0.00220) (0.000839) 
Some 
College 
Female Gas 
0.00425*** 0.00151 0.00200 0.000205 
  (0.00134) (0.00138) (0.00174) (0.000526) 
Some 
College 
Female 
Leisure-
Male 
-0.0246*** 0.0138* 0.00949 -0.00328* 
  (0.00860) (0.00718) (0.00700) (0.00185) 
Some 
College 
Female 
Leisure-
Female 
-0.0276*** -0.0116* -0.00296 0.000206 
  (0.00803) (0.00694) (0.00676) (0.00171) 
Some 
College 
Female Other 
0.0480*** -0.00361 -0.00853*** 0.00287 
  (0.00386) (0.00236) (0.00295) (0.00177) 
Some 
College 
Male Gas 
0.000618 -0.000435 0.000352 0.000899* 
  (0.00131) (0.00138) (0.00170) (0.000525) 
Some 
College 
Male 
Leisure-
Male 
-0.0181** -0.0178** -0.0107 0.00160 
  (0.00905) (0.00716) (0.00686) (0.00184) 
Some 
College 
Male 
Leisure-
Female 
-0.00810 0.0143** -0.000184 -0.000768 
  (0.00847) (0.00693) (0.00661) (0.00170) 
Some 
College 
Male Other 
0.0255*** 0.00394* 0.0105*** -0.00173 
  (0.00399) (0.00235) (0.00289) (0.00177) 
College 
Female Gas 
0.000201 -0.00115 0.00158 -0.000158 
  (0.000994) (0.00103) (0.00138) (0.000328) 
 
111 
 
Variables Good Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
College 
Female 
Leisure-
Male 
-0.0177*** -0.0117** 0.00350 -0.00299*** 
  (0.00685) (0.00536) (0.00554) (0.00115) 
College 
Female 
Leisure-
Female 
0.0145** 0.0167*** 0.00563 0.00279*** 
  (0.00652) (0.00517) (0.00536) (0.00106) 
College 
Female Other 
0.00304 -0.00382** -0.0107*** 0.000363 
  (0.00376) (0.00177) (0.00236) (0.00110) 
College 
Male Gas 
0.00131 0.00258** 0.000661 0.000493 
  (0.00108) (0.00113) (0.00154) (0.000359) 
College 
Male 
Leisure-
Male 
-0.00102 0.0121** 0.000326 0.00165 
  (0.00750) (0.00586) (0.00623) (0.00126) 
College 
Male 
Leisure-
Female 
-0.0168** -0.0120** -0.00924 -0.00277** 
  (0.00705) (0.00567) (0.00602) (0.00116) 
College 
Male Other 
0.0165*** -0.00276 0.00825*** 0.000632 
  (0.00343) (0.00192) (0.00264) (0.00124) 
Real Income Gas 0.00373*** 0.00241** 0.00800*** -5.91e-05 
  (0.000618) (0.00117) (0.00193) (0.000213) 
Real Income 
Leisure-
Male 
-0.0553*** -0.0838*** -0.126*** -0.0214*** 
  (0.00433) (0.00618) (0.00756) (0.000948) 
Real Income 
Leisure-
Female 
-0.0499*** -0.0572*** -0.116*** -0.0181*** 
  (0.00401) (0.00588) (0.00728) (0.000823) 
Real Income Other 0.101*** 0.139*** 0.234*** 0.0396*** 
  (0.00306) (0.00363) (0.00674) (0.00151) 
Number of 
Children Gas 
0.000180 0.000376 -0.000664* -7.07e-05 
  (0.000148) (0.000238) (0.000386) (8.30e-05) 
Number of 
Children 
Leisure-
Male 
-0.00316*** 0.00433*** 0.00562*** 0.000160 
  (0.00102) (0.00129) (0.00153) (0.000415) 
Number of 
Children 
Leisure-
Female 
0.00202** 0.00211* 0.0119*** 0.00108*** 
  (0.000996) (0.00122) (0.00148) (0.000372) 
Number of 
Children Other 
0.000954 -0.00681*** -0.0168*** -0.00117* 
  (0.000705) (0.000944) (0.00134) (0.000644) 
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Variables Good Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
Gas 
Propensity Gas 
-0.00795*** -0.00415 -0.0101 0.000152 
  (0.00259) (0.00411) (0.00839) (0.00286) 
Gas 
Propensity 
Leisure-
Male 
-0.0103 -0.00921 0.0195 0.00489 
  (0.0179) (0.0213) (0.0337) (0.0101) 
Gas 
Propensity 
Leisure-
Female 
0.00749 -0.00712 -0.0195 0.00538 
  (0.0168) (0.0205) (0.0326) (0.00934) 
Gas 
Propensity Other 
0.0108 0.0205*** 0.0101 -0.0104 
  (0.00821) (0.00729) (0.0145) (0.00991) 
α Gas 0.00233 0.0129** 0.000892 0.000895 
  (0.00453) (0.00614) (0.00738) (0.00722) 
α 
Leisure-
Male 
-0.00300*** -0.000217 -0.000361 0.00392*** 
  (0.000590) (0.000515) (0.000538) (0.00125) 
α 
Leisure-
Female 
-0.00131** -0.000980** -1.54e-05 0.00316** 
  (0.000514) (0.000475) (0.000536) (0.00124) 
α Other 0.00198 -0.0117* -0.000516 -0.00797 
  (0.00450) (0.00615) (0.00742) (0.00734) 
β Gas 0.0287*** -0.00228 -0.00492*** -0.0244*** 
  (0.00311) (0.00157) (0.00107) (0.00279) 
β 
Leisure-
Male 
0.0126*** 0.000139 -0.00427** -0.0302*** 
  (0.00242) (0.000962) (0.00195) (0.00290) 
β 
Leisure-
Female 
-0.0383*** 0.00236** 0.00955*** 0.0507*** 
  (0.00196) (0.00117) (0.00253) (0.00460) 
β Other 0.0140*** -0.000517 -0.00191** -0.0254*** 
  (0.00245) (0.00112) (0.000957) (0.00452) 
γ Gas, Gas -0.0252*** 0.00136 0.00619*** 0.0525*** 
  (0.00166) (0.00112) (0.00213) (0.00653) 
γ 
Gas, 
Leisure 
Male 
0.0616*** 0.00798 -0.0152* -0.0952*** 
  (0.00489) (0.00627) (0.00860) (0.0124) 
γ 
Gas, 
Leisure 
Female 
0.0440*** 0.0418*** 0.0444*** 0.0770*** 
  (0.00564) (0.00734) (0.00752) (0.0165) 
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Variables Good Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
γ 
Gas 
Leisure 
Other 
0.148*** -0.0108*** -0.00853*** -0.234*** 
  (0.0103) (0.00277) (0.00243) (0.0158) 
γ 
Leisure 
Male, 
Leisure 
Male 
0.130*** 0.00301 -0.00376 -0.174*** 
  (0.00973) (0.00292) (0.00271) (0.0177) 
γ 
Leisure 
Male, 
Leisure 
Female 
0.678*** 0.966*** 0.968*** 1.331*** 
  (0.0142) (0.00810) (0.00832) (0.0260) 
γ 
Leisure 
Male, 
Other 
-0.0294*** -0.0208** -0.0593*** -0.0163*** 
  (0.00510) (0.00972) (0.0158) (0.00562) 
γ 
Leisure 
Female, 
Leisure 
Female 
0.405*** 0.713*** 0.925*** 0.270*** 
  (0.0329) (0.0458) (0.0562) (0.00824) 
γ 
Leisure 
Female, 
Other 
0.346*** 0.533*** 0.956*** 0.224*** 
  (0.0305) (0.0438) (0.0552) (0.00873) 
γ 
Other, 
Other 
-0.722*** -1.226*** -1.822*** -0.478*** 
  (0.0200) (0.0245) (0.0470) (0.0101) 
Observations  1,017 1,009 1,012 1,009 
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